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In this  paper  we present  and  confront  the  expected  outcome  of  an  increase  in  risk on  the  regional  or
sectoral  allocation  of labor  force  and employment.  The  basic  frameworks  are  the  benchmark  dualistic
scenarios.  A single-input  analysis  of  a homogeneous  product  economy  is provided.  Uncertainty  is  modeled
as localized  Bernoulli  random  experiments,  additively  affecting  either  labor  demand  or labor  productivity,
unilaterally,  or  in  a  perfectly  (positive  and  negative)  correlated  fashion  in  both  regions  providing  a  stage
from which  conclusions  on  the  expected  consequences  of  random  shocks  (or of changes  in workers’
heterogeneity)  to  the  economy  can  be  drawn.  A (deterministic)  differentiated  natural  appeal  of  —an
intrinsic  imbalance  between,  a compensating  income  differential  required  by  afﬁliates  of  one  sector—
the  two  regions  is  allowed  to interact  with  equilibrium  formation.
We report  the  main  effects  on equilibrium  local  expected  wages,  supply,  employment  and  aggregate
welfare  surplus  of  a unilateral  as well  as  a simultaneous  increase  of labor  demand  dispersion  in  the (a)
basic  two-sector  model  in  four  different  scenarios:  free  market;  partial  (one-sector)  coverage  with perfect
inter-sector  mobility;  partial  (one-sector)  coverage  with  imperfect  mobility  (Harris-Todaro);  multiple
(two-sector)  coverage  with  imperfect  mobility  (Bhagwati-Hamada).
Importance  of convexity  of  local  labor  demands  was  invariably  recognized.  A localized  increase  in  risk
does not  always  repel  the labor  force  in  the  long-run.  This  statement  would  hold even  if individuals  were
not risk-neutral,  as  assumed  in  the  research.
© 2014  Universidad  ESAN.  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the
CC BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
El  impacto  del  riesgo  y  la  movilidad  en  los  modelos  dualísticos:  migración  bajo
shocks  aleatorios
EL classiﬁcation:
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En  este  documento  presentamos  y confrontamos  los  resultados  esperados  del incremento  del riesgo  de
la distribución  sectorial  de  la  mano  de  obra  y el  empleo.  Los  marcos  básicos  son  los  escenarios  dualís-
ticos  de  referencia.  Se  aporta  el  análisis  con un  solo  input  de  una  economía  de  producto  homogéneo.23
La  incertidumbre  se modela  como  experimento  localizado  y  aleatorio  de  Bernoulli,  afectando  en  forma
acumulada  a la demanda  de  mano  de  obra  o a  la  productividad  laboral  de  modo  unilateral,  o  de  manera59
perfectamente  correlacionada  (positiva  o  negativamente)  en  ambas  regiones,  proporcionando  un  esce-89
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nario desde  el  que pueden  extraerse  conclusiones  sobre  las  consecuencias  que  se esperan  de  los shocks
aleatorios  (o de  los  cambios  de  heterogeneidad  de los trabajadores)  para  la economía.  Se permite  la
interacción,  entre  las dos  regiones,  del llamamiento  natural  diferenciado  (determinista),  el desequilibrio
intrínseco  y la  compensación  del  diferencial  de  los  ingresos  requerida  por  los  aﬁliados  de  un  sector,  con
formación  de  equilibrio.
 This research was presented at the 2005 ASSET – Association of Southern European Economic Theorists annual meeting, in Rethymno, Crete.
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Palabras clave:
Riesgo (incertidumbre) y migración
Riesgo (incertidumbre) y movilidad
Riesgo (incertidumbre) y mercados
laborales segmentados
Mercados laborales regionales
Reportamos  los  principales  efectos  sobre  los  salarios  locales  previstos  en  equilibrio,  el  suministro,  el
empleo  y  el  excedente  del bienestar  acumulado  de  un incremento  unilateral  y simultáneo  de  la dispersión
de la  demanda  de  mano  de  obra  en  el (a) modelo  básico  bi-sectorial  en  cuatro  escenarios  diferentes:
mercado  libre;  cobertura  parcial  (unisectorial)  con  movilidad  perfecta  intersectorial;  cobertura  parcial
(unisectorial)  con movilidad  imperfecta  (Harris-Todaro);  cobertura  múltiple  (bi-sectorial)  con  movilidad
imperfecta  (Bhagwati-Hamada).
Invariablemente,  se  reconoció  la importancia  de  la convexidad  de  las  demandas  locales  de  mano  de
obra.  El  incremento  localizado  del  riesgo  no  siempre  ahuyenta  a la mano  de  obra  a largo  plazo.  Esta  ase-
veración  se  mantendría  incluso  cuando  los individuos  no  fueran  neutros  al  riesgo,  según  los  supuestos  de
la  investigación.
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. Introduction
The aim of this research is to contrast the expected long-run
mpact of exogenous uncertainty on labor force ﬂows and expected
ages under alternative scenarios of institutional wage setting and
arriers to mobility. The study of the matter would be a-temporally
elevant; to the extent that migration issues are being discussed
mong the EU member states, and given the recent enlargement to
ew economies with different market rules on the one hand, and
ecurity proﬁles on the other, the layout of theoretical foundations
or the understanding of those effects would appear as a timely
xercise.
The basic structures chosen to replicate the effects of
ncertainty were simple dualistic models in the tradition of Harris-
odaro (1970) rural-urban migration analysis. A good survey of
heoretical literature can be found in Bhattacharya (1993). The prin-
iples behind its workings became widespread in the study of labor
arket regional as also sector —occupation, profession— alloca-
ion and under minimum or other wage legislation or restrictions.
xamples of these can be found in Mincer (1976), McDonald and
olow (1985), Fields (1989), Brown, Gilroy and Kohen (1982). A sur-
ey of segmented labor markets can be seen in McNabb and Ryan
1990); and the applications of the theory with microfoundations
or several dualistic structures can be found in Saint-Paul (1996).
We follow the cases contrasted in Martins (1996), inspecting
he consequences of introducing a local stochastic noise of vari-
us nature in each of the scenarios, these differing according to
he degree of mobility across the two sectors —of whether there is
mmediate access to the other region jobs or not—, and to whether
ny or both regions or sectors are subject to an (also exogenous)
nstitutional wage ﬂoor.
Total —national, worldwide according to context we  may  wish
o simulate— labor force supply is assumed perfectly inelastic.
orkers choose location, or sector afﬁliation, maximizing the
xpected wage —risk-neutrality allows us to concentrate on how
echnology characteristics rather than risk-aversion of the individ-
als (the role of individual’s risk-aversion on migration decisions
as been studied before and was surveyed by Stark (1991). It was
ur purpose to generate, thus, other type of conclusions) of the
opulation affect the market equilibrium responses—.
Exogenous uncertainty itself may  interplay with the underly-
ng local technologies in different ways. Two environments were
lways simulated: when uncertainty works as an (null expected
ean) added noise to local labor demand —quantity uncertainty;
nd added to the inverse labor demand— that is, to labor produc-
ivity. For simplicity, such noise was modeled as a binary random
hock —conclusions shouldn’t change qualitatively if we assumed
 general distribution— and we inspected the effect of an increase
n its variance maintaining the mean constant. (That is a general
onclusion in the inspection of the effects of uncertainty on the
isk-premium (Martins, 2004)).
As the prototype economy has two regions or sectors, perfectly
positively and negatively) correlated increases in local risks wereblicado  por  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  Este  es un  artículo  Open  Access  bajo  la
encia  CC  BY-NC-ND  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
also simulated. Changes in uncertainty can also mimic changes in
the degree of heterogeneity of the labor force —or local productive
ability to cope with them—.
Being mobility of major concern in the analysis, two  extreme
cases of “barriers to adjustment” were also thought to be impor-
tant in the inquiry: either adjustment to uncertainty is assumed
to be immediate to the random shock. Then, the long-run equi-
librium differs according to which, and is formed after the,
exogenous impulse is observed —ex-post ﬂexibility—. Or binding
location/sector afﬁliation decisions are taken before the actual risk
realization —ex-ante location choices—. (See Aiginger (1987) and
Martins (2004a) for a survey and appraisal of the effects of uncer-
tainty on production outcomes under the two contexts). Obviously,
the latter stages wage dispersion more appropriately if the local
wage is left as market determined rather than institutionally ﬁxed.
After notation is brieﬂy settled in Section II, we depart from the
benchmark case —free market with perfect mobility across regions
or sectors—, outlined in Section III. In Section IV, partial coverage
with perfect mobility —i.e., people not employed in the primary
sector can immediately get a job in the secondary sector and wait
there for an opportunity to switch, and thus, there is (again) no
unemployment generation— is introduced. In Section V, a version
of the Harris-Todaro model —with imperfect mobility and institu-
tionally ﬁxed wage in one of the sectors— is inspected. In Section
VII, the Bhagwati-Hamada economy —with two covered regions
or sectors— is forwarded. The exposition ends with a concluding
appraisal in Section VII.
2. Notation
There are two  regions —or two  sectors— and a ﬁxed exogenous
labor supply, L;−. This total labor supply decides whether to locate
in region (or afﬁliate to sector) 1 or 2. Denote by L;−i local/industry
supply in region/sector i. Then:
L;−1 + L;−2 = L;− (1)
In region i, the baseline deterministic aggregate demand func-
tion is given by:
Li = Li(Wi), i = 1, 2 (2)
A non-positive slope – that is, dLi/dWi = Li(Wi)’ ≤ 0 – is always
assumed. Denote the corresponding inverse demand function by:
Wi = Wi(Li), i = 1, 2 (3)
iThere are no cross effects, i.e., dL /dWj = 0 for i /= j. The wage
elasticity of demand of region i at a particular point of labor demand
will be denoted by
εi = Li(Wi)′Wi/Li(Wi) = Wi(Li)/[Wi(Li)′Li]. (4)
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Let Zi be a Bernoulli lottery of null expected value: with proba-
ility qi it takes value si; with probability (1 – qi), it takes the value
qisi
1−qi .
ar(Zi) =
qis
2
i
1 − qi
(5)
Var(Zi) increases with si if si is positive, decreases if it is negative
 a change in risk is modeled as a change in si, increasing with it if
i > 0, decreasing if si < 0: we simulate a “mean preserving spread”
n the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).
Two general risky environments are simulated: additive abso-
ute uncertainty Zi is either added to local labor demand —and
enoted by Xi — quantity uncertainty:
i = Li(Wi) + Xi; and Wi = Wi(Li − Xi), i = 1, 2 (6)
Or to labor productivity – Yi:
i = Li(Wi − Yi); and Wi = Wi(Li) + Yi, i = 1, 2 (7)
Then, meaningful effects are found – and, hence, inspected – for
nvironments of:
1) Ex-post ﬂexibility: the individuals make location choices after
he observation of Zi. We  will denote the equilibrium wage gener-
ted or labor force located in region i by:
Under Xi : W
A
i or L;
−iA when si occurs; W
B
i or L;
−iB when − qisi
1 − qi
does.
Under Yi : W
C
i or L;
−iC when si occurs; W
D
i or L;
−iD when − qisi
1 − qi
does.
(8)
2) Ex-ante location arrangements. The population ﬁxes itself or
fﬁliates to a sector. Once there, if in a uncovered sector, it suffers
andom wage ﬂuctuations; if in a covered sector, it is subject to
mployment availability uncertainty.
The background technology and preferences in the economy
re anything but complex: an homogeneous good is produced and
onsumed in both regions. Identical workers as “land-owners” con-
ume directly what they produce or receive as income: there is no
reason to), nor (need for) money. We  allow for regional (sectoral)
mbalances in terms of intrinsic resources: location in region 2 sys-
ematically provides a income-valued differential a in favor of each
f its residents (a is allowed to be negative, though).
We will assume further through Sections II to V a subset of the
ollowing:
1. individuals are risk neutral and maximize expected income.
2.a. only region i is affected by risk –and Zj = 0.
2.b. both regions are affected by perfectly positively correlated
ncertainty – and Zj = Zi = Z.
2.c. both regions are affected by perfectly negatively correlated
ncertainty – and Zj = − Zi = − Z.
3.a. there is perfect mobility across regions, alternatively.
3.b. job rotation is only accomplished locally or within the indus-
ry.
4.a. wage in region 1 is determined by market conditions, alter-
atively.
4.b. wage in region 1 is institutionally determined.
5.a. wage in region 2 is market determined, alternatively.
5.b. wage in region 2 is institutionally determined.
Given assumption 1 – always assumed -, and the fact that a dif-
erential favors (for a > 0) region 2, an equilibrium will be such
hat1:
[Wj1] = a + E[W
j
2] j = ∗, A, B (9)
where * denotes an ex-ante decision context. Worker ﬂows will
xist till equalization of expected wage net of the compensation
mount in the two regions.
1 Except with perfect mobility and one institutional wage. Administrative Science 20 (2015) 2–20
Assumptions 2 stage different types of local risks. 2.a is useful
to analyze the impact of unilateral risk level —inducing conclu-
sions expected to be generalizable to situations where both regions
are subject to uncertainty and the change in risk occurs in only
one of them. 2.b and 2.c allow for a relation between uncertainty
movements in the two regions— under ex-ante location commit-
ments, the sign of the pertaining correlation becomes in some sense
redundant to the determination of labor force ﬂows.
Assumptions 3 to 5 characterize the mobility environment. Dif-
ferent combinations of alternatives a and b generate backgrounds
of benchmark dualistic models that we  shall stage. For instance, 3.a.
insures that expected unemployment in the economy will be zero
—provided that the wage is market determined in at least one of
the regions—.
The ﬁxed institutional wage mimicks a minimum wage in the
region.
3. Competitive labor markets under perfect mobility
Assume 3.a, 4.a and 5.a of the previous section. Then, under cer-
tainty equilibrium, labor ﬂows will be expected between the two
regions while equalization of individuals’ welfare is not achieved,
i.e., till:
W1 = a + W2 (10)
and
L1(W2 + a) + L2(W2) = L;− or W1(L1) = W2(L;− − L1) + a (11)
Differentiating equation (11), a change in the relative differen-
tial favoring region 2 will imply changes in wages and employment
allocation according to:
∂W2/∂a = −L1(W2 + a)′/[L1(W2 + a)′ + L2(W2)′] < 0 (12)
∂W1/∂a = L2(W2 + a)′/[L1(W2 + a)′ + L2(W2)′] > 0 (13)
∂L1/∂a  = 1/[W1(L1)′ + W2(L;− − L1)′] < 0 (14)
where the inequalities follow from the assumed negative slope
of the labor demand curves (and thus negative slopes of the inverse
labor demand).
The wage bill —and the expected wage in the economy— will
react according to:
∂(W1L1 + W2L2)/∂a = L;−∂W2/∂a + L1 + a ∂L1/∂a (15)
It will increase (decrease) with a if
−[L1(W2 + a)/L1(W2 + a)′ − L2(W2)/L2(W2)′] > (<)a
or
[L1(W2 + a)′/L1(W2 + a)′ − L2(W2)′/L2(W2)]/
[L1(W2 + a)′/L1(W2 + a)] [L2(W2)′/L2(W2)] > (<)  a
i.e., the difference between the absolute value of the semi-elasticity
of labor demand in region 2 and that of 1 over their product —or
the difference between the inverse of the semi-elasticities of those
labor demands— exceeds (is smaller than) a, the per capita exter-
nality favoring inhabitants of region (or professionals of sector)
2.
Yet, the individual’s worker well-being is in fact measured by the
equilibrium value of W1 – and aggregate workers’ welfare value L ;
W1, rising with a.
Proposition 1: 1.1. Under free market, the usual dualistic model
will result in equalization of wages net of compensating different-
ials across regions or sectors and there will be no unemployment.
1.2. An increase in local externalities favouring one of the
regions will attract the labor force to the latter, depress the local
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age and increase it in the other region. The average wage in the
conomy will increase (decrease) if the difference between the
bsolute value of the semi-elasticity of labor demand in the favored
egion and that of the other over their product exceeds (is smaller
han) the per capita externality differential. Aggregate welfare will
ncrease.
.1. Quantity uncertainty
.1.1. Ex-post ﬂexibility
Consider case 2.a: only region i is affected by uncertainty. The
abor force requires:
j
1 = a + W
j
2; j = A, B (16)
Either si is observed – which occurs with probability qi – and
1(WA2 + a) + L2(WA2) + si = L;−
Then, differentiating:
WA2/∂si = −1/[L1(WA2 + a)′ + L2(W2A)′] > 0
Or, with probability (1 – qi), − qisi1−qi is and:
1(WB2 + a) −
qisi
1 − qi
+ L2(WB2) = L;−
And differentiating
WB2/∂si =
qi
1 − qi
/[L1(WB2 + a)′ + L2(WB2)′] < 0
As ∂WA2/∂si > 0 (and/or W
B
2/∂si < 0),  for si > (<)0,  W
A
2 >
<)WB2. On average:
The expected wage responds to uncertainty according to:
∂E[W2]/∂si = qi∂WA2/∂si + (1 − qi)∂WB2/∂si
= qi{1/[L1(WB2 + a)′ + L2(WB2)′] − 1/[L1(WA2 + a)′ + L2(WA2)′]}
= qi{[L1(WA2 + a)′ + L2(WA2)′] − [L1(WB2 + a)′ + L2(WB2)′]}/
{[L1(WA2 + a)′ + L2(WA2)′][L1(WB2 + a)′ + L2(WB2)′]}
(17)
For si > (<)0,  W
A
2 > (<)W
B
2 and ∂E[W2]/∂si > (<) 0 if L
1(W + a)’
 L2(W)’ rises with W.  That occurs when (around a = 0, if the sum
f) both labor demands are (is) convex in W – that is, L1(W)” > 0
nd L2(W)” > 0. E[W2] decreases with uncertainty (rises with si if
ositive, decreases if negative) when both (around a = 0, the sum
f) labor demands are (is) concave.
Overall, no unemployment is ever generated in the economy.
abor force allocation changes both immediately after a shock, as
n expected terms when si rises. When uncertainty rises in region
:
∂E[L1(W2 + a) + X1]/∂s1 = −∂E[L2(W2)]/∂s1
= −[q1∂L2(WA2)/∂s1 + (1 − q1)∂L2(WB2)/∂s1]
= −[q1L2(WA2)′∂WA2/∂s1 + (1 − q1)L2(WB2)′∂WB2/∂s1]
= q1{[L1(WB2 + a)′/L2(WB2)′] − [L1(WA2 + a)′/L2(WA2)′]}
(18)L2(WA2)
′ L2(WB2)
′/{[L1(WA2 + a)′ + L2(WA2)′][L1(WB2 + a)′ + L2(WB2)′]}
For s1 > (<)0,  W
A
2 > (<)W
B
2 and ∂E[L1]/∂s1 > (<) 0 if L
1(W + a)’
 L2(W)’ decreases with W. Administrative Science 20 (2015) 2–20 5
If it rises in region 2:
∂E[L1(W2 + a)]/∂s2 = −∂E[L2(W2) + X2]/∂s2
= q2∂L1(WA2 + a)/∂s2 + (1 − q2)∂L1(WB2 + a)/∂s2
= q2L1(WA2 + a)′∂WA2/∂s2 + (1 − q2)L1(WB2 + a)′∂WB2/∂s2
= q2{[L2(WA2)′/L1(WA2 + a)′] − [L2(WB2)′/L1(WB2 + a)′]}
L1(WA2 + a)′L1(WB2 + a)′/{[L1(WA2 + a)′ + L2(WA2)′][L1(WB2 + a)′
+L2(WB2)′]}
(19)
For s2 > (<)0,  W
A
2 > (<)W
B
2 and ∂E[L2]/∂s2 > (<) 0 if L
2(W)’
/ L1(W + a)’ decreases with W.  Around a = 0, that requires that
L2(W)” / L2(W)’ < L1(W)” / L1(W)’: E[L2] increases (decreases) with
uncertainty in region 2 (rises with s2 if positive, decreases if nega-
tive) if the symmetric of the Arrow-Pratt (Arrow, 1965; Pratt, 1964)
measure of risk aversion of the local demand (negatively sloped
—see section VII below—) is smaller (larger) than that of the other
regions.
Remark 1: If at a given level of the argument W,  the ratio of
marginal values L1(W)’ / L2(W)’ increases with W,  the function
L1(W)  exhibits:
• lower risk aversion than the function L2(W), and − L1(W)” / L1(W)’
< − L2(W)” / L2(W)’ when Lj(W)’ > 0.
• higher risk aversion than the function L2(W), and L1(W)” / L1(W)’
> L2(W)” / L2(W)’, when Lj(W)’ < 0.
Consider now perfectly and positively correlated uncertainty in
the two regions —case 2.b. Then, either s is observed – which occurs
with probability q – and
L1(WA2 + a) + s + L2(WA2) + s = L;−
Or, with probability (1 – q), − qs1−q is and:
L1(WB2 + a) −
qs
1 − q + L
2(WB2) −
qs
1 − q = L;
−
Wage - W2 - multipliers will double relative to the unilateral
uncertainty case – and conclusions remain unaltered.
As for employment:
∂E[L1(W2 + a) + X]/∂s = −∂E[L2(W2) + X]/∂s
= q ∂L1(WA2 + a)/∂s + (1 − q)∂L1(WB2 + a)/∂s
= q L1(WA2 + a)′∂WA2/∂s  + (1 − q)L1(WB2 + a)′∂WB2/∂s
= 2q{[L2(WA2)′/L1(WA2 + a)′] − [L2(WB2)′/L1(WB2 + a)′]}
L1(WA2 + a)′L1(WB2 + a)′/{[L1(WA2 + a)′ + L2(WA2)′] [L1(WB2 + a)′
+L2(WB2)′]}
(20)
For s > (<)0,  WA2 > (<)W
B
2 and ∂E[L1]/∂s > (<) 0 if L
2(W)’ /
L1(W + a)’ increases with W.  Around a = 0, that requires that
L2(W)” / L2(W)’ > L1(W)” / L1(W)’: E[L1] increases (decreases) with
uncertainty (rises with s if positive, decreases if negative) if the
symmetric of the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion of the local –
region 1’s - demand is smaller (larger) than that of the other regions.
With negatively correlated uncertainty —hypothesis 2.c.—, the
wage is invariant to and stabilized at the level for which:
L1(W2 + a) + L2(W2) = L;− (21)
Employment in each region ﬂuctuates mimicking the localshock. Expected local employment does not vary with uncertainty.
Summarizing:
Proposition 2: Under free market, quantity uncertainty and ex-
post location ﬂexibility:
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2.1. A unilateral or generalized and positively correlated across
egions increase in risk will result in a rise (decrease) in the
xpected “net” wage if the sum of labor demands is convex (con-
ave).
2.2. A unilateral or generalized and positively and perfectly cor-
elated across regions increase in risk will result in a rise (decrease)
n the expected employment in a region if the ratio of its labor
emand slope to the other region’s decreases (increases) with the
age rate, that is, if the symmetric of the Arrow-Pratt measure
f risk aversion of the local demand (negatively sloped) is smaller
larger) than that of the other regions.
2.3. Perfectly and negatively correlated labor demand shocks
ill result in equal employment movements after a shock, neutral-
zing any effect on the expected wages or local labor force in the
conomy.
.1.2. Ex-ante location arrangements
Consider case 2.a: only sector i is affected by uncertainty. The
abor force settles or afﬁliates before observing Xi; after, when it
akes location changes to region i, it does not know which Xi it is
oing to face. For equilibrium:
iW
i(Li − si) + (1 − qi)Wi(Li +
qisi
1 − qi
) = Wj(L;− − Li) ± a
Then, differentiating:
∂Li/∂si = qi[Wi(Li − si)′ − Wi(Li +
qisi
1 − qi
)′]
/[qiW
i(Li − si)′ + (1 − qi)Wi(Li +
qisi
1 − qi
)′ + Wj(L;− − Li)′]
(22)
nd
E[Wi]/∂si = ∂E[Wj]/∂si = −Wj(L;− − Li)′∂Li/∂si (23)
The expected wage in the economy moves in the same direc-
ion as employment of the region where uncertainty is changing.
mployment will ﬂow to the region when local uncertainty rises
decreases) − ∂Li/∂si > (<) 0 when si > 0, ∂Li/∂si < (>) 0 when si < 0
 if Wi(L)” > (<) 0, which occurs, once labor demand is negatively
loped, when Li(W)” > (<) 0, i.e., when labor demand in region i is
onvex (concave).
Consider case 2.b: both sectors are affected by simultaneous
dentical shocks. For equilibrium:
qW1(L1 − s) + (1 − q)W1(L1 +
qs
1 − q )
= qW2(L;− − L1 − s) + (1 − q)W2(L;− − L1 +
qs
1 − q ) + a
Then:
∂L1/∂s = q{[W1(L1 − s)′ − W1(L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′]
−[W2(L;− − L1 − s) − W2(L;− − L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′]}/
[qW1(L1 − s)′ + (1 − q)W1(L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′
(24)+q  W2(L;− − L1 − s)′ + (1 − q)W2(L;− − L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′]
Employment will ﬂow to region 1 when general uncertainty
ises (decreases) − ∂L1/∂s > (<) 0 when s > 0, ∂L1/∂s < (>) 0 when s
 0 − if W1(L + g)’ − W2(L;− − L + g)’ increases (decreases) with g,
hich occurs, once labor demand is negatively sloped, when W1(L)”
 W2(L;− − L)” i.e., when inverse labor demand in region 1 is more
onvex (concave) than that of region 2. As for the wage: Administrative Science 20 (2015) 2–20
∂E[W1]/∂s
=  ∂E[W2]/∂s = [q W1(L1 − s)′ + (1 − q)W1(L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′]∂L1/∂s
−q[W1(L1 − s)′ − W1(L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′]
= −q{W1(L1 − s)′[2 q W2(L;− − L1 − s)′
+(1 − 2q)W2(L;− − L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′]
+W1(L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′[(1 − 2q) W2(L;− − L1 − s)′
−2(1 − q)W2(L;− − L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′]}/
[qW1(L1 − s)′ + (1 − q)W1(L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′ + q W2(L;− − L1 − s)′
+(1 − q)W2(L;− − L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′]
As W1(L1 − s)′[2 q W2(L;− − L1 − s)′ + (1 − 2q) W2(L;− − L1
+ qs
1 − q )
′] + W1(L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′[(1 − 2q)W2(L;− − L1 − s)′
−2(1 − q)W2(L;− − L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′]
= [W1(L1 − s)′ − W1(L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′] [qW2(L;− − L1 − s)′
+(1 − q) W2(L;− − L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′]
+[W2(L;− − L1 − s) − W2(L;− − L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′] [q W1(L1 − s)
+(1 − q)W1(L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′]
(25)
and has the sign of ∂E[W1]/∂s, we expect that the expected wage
will rise (decrease) with uncertainty if both inverse demands are
convex (concave).
Finally, take case 2.c: both regions are affected by simultaneous
symmetrical shocks. For equilibrium:
q W1(L1 − s) + (1 − q)W1(L1 +
qs
1 − q )
= q W2(L;− − L1 + s) + (1 − q)W2(L;− − L1 −
qs
1 − q ) + a
Then, differentiating:
∂L1/∂s  = q{[W1(L1 − s)′ − W1(L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′]
+[W2(L;− − L1 + s) − W2(L;− − L1 −
qs
1 − q )
′]}/
[q W1(L1 − s) + (1 − q)W1(L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′ + q W2(L;− − L1 + s)′
+(1 − q) W2(L;− − L1 −
qs
1 − q )
′]
(26)
Approximately —through Taylor expansion to the ﬁrst-order of
the terms in the numerator—, ∂L1/∂s > 0 if s > 0 (and ∂L1/∂s < 0
when s < 0), if W1(L1)” > W2(L;− − L1)”: employment rises in the
region which has a more convex inverse labor demand.
As for the expected wage:
∂E[W1]/∂s = E[W2]/∂s = [q W1(L1 − s)′ + (1 − q)W1(L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′]
×∂L1/∂s − q[W1(L1 − s)′ − W1(L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′]
= q W2(L;− − L1 + s)′W2(L;− − L1 −
qs
1 − q )
′
[W1(L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′/W2(L;− − L1 −
qs
1 − q )
′]
−W1(L1 − s)/W2(L;− − L1 + s)′]/
(27)[q W1(L1 − s)′ + (1 − q)W1(L1 +
qs
1 − q )
′ + q W2(L;− − L1 + s)′
+(1 − q)W2(L;− − L1 −
qs
1 − q )
′]
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The expected wage increases (decreases) when general uncer-
ainty rises − ∂E[W1]/∂s > (<) 0 when s > 0, ∂E[W1]/∂s < (>) 0 when
 < 0 − if W1(L + g)’ / W2(L;− − L − g)’ decreases (increases) with g –
r, equivalently, if W1(L + g)’ W2(L;− − L + g)’ decreases (increases)
ith g. That occurs, around g = 0, when W1(L)” / W1(L)’ + W2(L;−
 L)” / W2(L;− − L)’ < (>) 0 – the sum of the symmetric of the
rrow-Pratt measures of risk aversion of the inverse demands (that
ymmetric measuring their concavity) —is smaller (larger) than 0—.
Remark 2: If the product of the marginal values of two functions
f the same argument, W1(L)’ W2(L)’, increases with it, the sum of
he corresponding absolute risk aversion measures:
is negative and − W1(L)” / W1(L)’ − W2(L)” / W2(L)’ < 0 when
Wj(L)’ > 0.
is positive and W1(L)” / W1(L)’ + W2(L)” / W2(L)’ > 0 when Wj(L)’
< 0.
Proposition 3: Under free market, subject to quantity uncer-
ainty and to ex-ante location decisions:
3.1. A unilateral increase in risk will result in a rise (decrease)
n the expected wages and employment in the affected region if its
abor demand is convex (concave).
3.2. A generalized and perfectly correlated across regions
ncrease in risk will result in a rise (decrease) in the expected
mployment in the region of more convex (concave) inverse labor
emand.
3.3. A generalized and positively and perfectly correlated across
egions increase in risk will result in a rise (decrease) in the
xpected wages if both labor demands are convex (concave).
3.4. Perfectly and negatively correlated labor demand shocks
ill result in a rise (decrease) in the expected wages if the sum of
he symmetric of the Arrow-Pratt measures of risk aversion of the
nverse labor demands is negative (positive).
.2. Productivity uncertainty
.2.1. Ex-post ﬂexibility
Consider case 2.a: only region i, is affected by uncertainty, imply-
ng a noise around the observed wage distribution – subtracted
rom the local expected or average wage.
Let 1 be the region affected by uncertainty. Either s1 is observed
 which occurs with probability q1 – and
1(WC2 + a − s1) + L2(WC2) = L;−
Then:
WC2/∂s1 = L1(WC2 + a + s1)′/[L1(WC2 + a + s1)′ + L2(WC2)′] > 0
Or, with probability (1 – q1), − q1s11−q1 is and:
1(WD2 + a +
q1s1
1 − q1
) + L2(WD2 ) = L;−
and
∂WD2 /∂s1 = −L1(WD2 + a +
q1s1 )′/1 − q1
[L1(WD2 + a +
q1s1
1 − q1
)′ + L2(WD2 )′] < 0 Administrative Science 20 (2015) 2–20 7
As ∂WC2/∂s1 > 0 (and/or ∂W
D
2 /∂s1 < 0),  for s1 > (<)0,
WC2 > (<)W
D
2 . On average:
∂E[W2]/∂s1 = q1 WC2/∂s1 + (1 − q1)∂WD2 /∂s1
= q1{L1(WC2 + a − s1)′/[L1(WC2 + a − s1)′ + L2(WC2)′]
−L1(WD2 + a +
q1s1
1 − q1
)′/[L1(WD2 + a +
q1s1
1 − q1
)′ + L2(WD2 )′]}
= q1{1/[1 + L2(WC2)′/L1(WC2 + a − s1)′]
−1/[1 + L2(WD2 )′/L1(WD2 + a +
q1s1
1 − q1
)′]}
(28)
Overall, no unemployment is ever generated in the economy.
When uncertainty rises in region 1:
∂E[L1(W2 + a − Y1)]/∂s1 = −E[L2(W2)]/∂s1
= −[q1 ∂L2(WC2)/∂s1 + (1 − q1)∂L2(WD2 )/∂s1]
= −[q1 L2(WC2)′∂WC2/∂s1 + (1 − q1)L2(WD2 )′∂WD2 /∂s1]
= q1{1/[1/L2(WD2 )′ + 1/L1(WD2 + a +
q1s1
1 − q1
)′]
−1/[1/L2(WC2)′ + 1/L1(WC2 + a − s1)′]}
(29)
If it rises in region 2, we would have analogous conclusions. Let
us deﬁne the problem in terms of inverse demands: either s2 is
observed – which occurs with probability q2 – and
W1(L;− − LC2) = W2(LC2) + s2 + a
Then:
∂LC2/∂s2 = −1/[W1(L;− − LC2)′ + W2(LC2)′] > 0
Or, with probability (1 – q2), − q2s21−q2 is and:
W1(L;− − LD2 ) = W2(LD2 ) −
q2s2
1 − q2
+ a
and
∂LD2 /∂s2 = q21−q2 /[W
1(L;− − LD2 )′ + W2(LD2 )′] < 0
As ∂LC2/∂s2 > 0 (and/or ∂L
D
2 /∂s2 < 0),  for s2 > (<)0,
LC2 > (<)L
D
2 . On average:
∂E[L2]/∂s2 = q2LC2/∂s2 + (1 − q2)∂LD2 /∂s2
= q2{1/[W1(L;− − LD2 )′ + W2(LD2 )′] − 1/[W1(L;− − LC2)′
+W2(LC2)′]}
(30)
For s2 > (<)0,  L
C
2 > (<)L
D
2 and ∂E[L2]/∂s2 > (<) 0 if W
1(L;− −
L)’ + W2(L)’ rises with L. That requires that W2(L)” > W1(L;− − L)”:
E[L2] increases with uncertainty in region 2 (rises with s2 if positive,
decreases if negative) if the inverse demand in region 2 is more
convex than the ﬁrst one.
Overall, no unemployment is ever generated in the economy. As
for the baseline region 2’s wage:
∂E[W2]/∂s2 = E[W1]/∂s2 = ∂q2WC2/∂s2 + (1 − q2)∂WD2 /∂s2
= [q2∂W2(LC2)/∂s2 + (1 − q2)W2(LD2 )/∂s2]
= [q2W2(LC2)′LC2/∂s2 + (1 − q2)W2(LD2 )′∂LD2 /∂s2]
= q2{W2(LD2 )′/[W1(L;− − LD2 )′ + W2(LD2 )′]
2 C 1 − C ′ 2 C ′
(31)−W (L2)/[W (L; − L2) + W (L2) ]}
= q1{1/[W1(L;− − LD2 )′/W2(LD2 ) + 1] − 1/[W1(L;− − LC2)′/
W2(LD2 )
′ + 1]}
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For s2 > (<)0,  L
C
2 > (<)L
D
2 and ∂E[W2]/∂s2 > (<) 0 if W
2(L)’ /
W1(L;− − L)’ + W2(L)’] decreases with L – or, equivalently, W2(L)’ /
1(L;− − L)’ decreases with L. That requires that W2(L)” / W2(L)’ +
1(L;− − L)” / W1(L;− − L)’ < 0: E[W2] increases with uncertainty in
egion 2 (rises with s2 if positive, decreases if negative) when the
um of the symmetric of the Arrow-Pratt measures of risk aver-
ion of the inverse demands (negatively sloped) is negative (this
ccurs if both inverse - and direct, once they are negatively sloped
 demands are convex). It decreases when that sum is positive.
Consider now perfectly and positively correlated uncertainty in
he two regions - case 2.b. Then, either s is observed – which occurs
ith probability q – and
1(WC2 + a − s) + L2(WC2 − s) = L;−
Or, with probability (1 – q), − qs1−q is and:
1(WD2 + a +
qs
1 − q ) + L
2(WD2 +
qs
1 − q ) = L;
−
Then:
WC2/∂s  = 1
WD2 /∂s  = −
q
1 − q
E[W2]/∂s = q∂WC2/∂s  + (1 − q)∂WD2 /∂s  = 0 (32)
Employment is always stabilized after a shock – local employ-
ent remains constant after a realization of Y. Hence:
E[L1(W2 + a − Y)]/∂s = −∂E[L2(W2 − Y)]/s = 0 (33)
With negatively correlated uncertainty – hypothesis 2.c. -, either
 is observed – which occurs with probability q – and:
1(WC2 + a − s) + L2(WC2 + s) = L;−
r
1(L1) − a + s = W2(L;− − L1) − s
or − qs1−q is observed – which occurs with probability (1 – q) –
nd:
1(L1) − a −
qs
1 − q =  W
2(L;− − L1) +
qs
1 − q
Obviously, the multipliers double with respect to unilateral
ncertainty surrounding only one region and the consequences of
 rise in uncertainty are the same: E[Li] increases with uncertainty
rises with s if positive, decreases if negative) when the inverse
emand of region i is more convex than that of region j’s.
E[W2] and E[W1] increase with uncertainty (rises with s if pos-
tive, decreases if negative) when the sum of the symmetric of the
rrow-Pratt measures of risk aversion of the inverse demands (neg-
tively sloped) is negative (this occurs if both inverse - and direct,
nce they are negatively sloped - demands are convex).
Summarizing:
Proposition 4: Under free market, productivity uncertainty and
x-post location decisions:
4.1. A unilateral or generalized and negatively correlated across
egions increase in risk will result in a rise (decrease) in the
xpected employment of the region with more convex (concave)
nverse labor demand. Expected wages will rise (decrease) with
uch uncertainty if the sum of relative concavity (measured by
he symmetric of the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion) of the
nverse demand functions is negative (positive).
4.2. Perfectly and positively correlated wage shocks will result
n equal wage movements, neutralizing any effect on the expected
ages or local labor force of the economy. Administrative Science 20 (2015) 2–20
3.2.2. Ex-ante location arrangements
Productivity dispersion has no effect on the expected equilib-
rium if ex-ante decisions regarding quantities must be made.
Proposition 5: Under free market, productivity uncertainty, and
ex-ante decisions, labor market outcomes are invariant to disper-
sion in the wage distribution.
4. Partial coverage - The perfect mobility case
Assume 3.a, 4.b and 5.a. of section I. The wage in the two regions
differ potentially by more than a. In region 1, the wage is ﬁxed at
level W1. As the other region’s wage is free, it will decrease till all
the labor force is employed.
Under constrained wages in sector 1 and free mobility, expected
wage equalization may, therefore, never be fulﬁlled. Then the com-
pensating differential does not have a speciﬁc meaning – we can
consider it added to form the institutional W1, or that the resulting
equilibrium wage differential is already sufﬁcient to compensate
for it – i.e., naturally larger than a: the equilibrium wage of region
2, W2 < W1 – a for the minimum wage to be a binding restriction.
Otherwise, we fall into the case of section II.
Proposition 6: 6.1. In a dualistic model with perfect mobility
and institutional wage ﬁxed in one of the sectors, the equilibrium
wage in the second sector is lower than the free market wage. There
will be no unemployment.
6.2. An increase in local externalities favouring one of the
regions will have either no effect or render the institutional wage
barrier inactive.
4.1. Quantity uncertainty
4.1.1. Ex-post ﬂexibility
Consider case 2.a: only sector i is affected by uncertainty.
Either si is observed – which occurs with probability qi – and
L1(W1) + L2(WA2) + si = L;−
Then:
∂WA2/∂si = −1/L2(WA2)′ > 0
Or, with probability (1 – qi), − qisi1−qi is and:
L1(W1) −
qisi
1 − qi
+ L2(WB2) = L;−
and
∂WB2/∂si =
qi
1 − qi
/L2(WB2)
′ < 0
As ∂WA2/∂si > 0 (and/or ∂W
B
2/∂si < 0),  for si > (<)0,
WA2 > (<)W
B
2. On average:
∂E[W2]/∂si = qi∂WA2/∂si + (1 − qi)∂WB2/∂si
= qi[1/L2(WB2)′ − 1/L2(WA2)′]
= qi[L2(WA2)′ − L2(WB2)′]/[L2(WA2)′L2(WB2)′]
(34)
For si > (<)0,  W
A
2 > (<)W
B
2 and ∂E[W2]/∂si > (<) 0 if L
2(W)’
rises with W.  That occurs when the uncovered sector labor demand
is convex – that is, L2(W)” > 0. E[W2] decreases with uncertainty
(rises with si if positive, decreases if negative) when the uncovered
region labor demand is concave.
Overall, no unemployment is ever generated in the economy.
Labor force allocation changes only aftershocks in sector 1 - and
by the same magnitude. As E[Xi] = 0, a rise in si has no effect on
expected local employment:
∂E[L1(W1) + X1]/∂s1 = −∂E[L2(W2)]/∂s1 = 0 (35)
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nd:
E[L1(W1)]/∂s2 = −∂E[L2(W2) + X2]/∂s2 = 0 (36)
Consider now perfectly and positively correlated uncertainty in
he two regions - case 2.b. Then, either s is observed – which occurs
ith probability q – and
1(W1) + s + L2(WA2) + s = L;−
Or, with probability (1 – q), − qs1−q is and:
1(W1) −
qs
1 − q + L
2(WB2)− = L;−
Multipliers will double relative to the unilateral uncertainty case
 and conclusions remain unaltered.
As for employment, again:
E[L1(W1) + X]/∂s = −∂E[L2(W2) + X]/∂s = 0 (37)
With negatively correlated uncertainty – hypothesis 2.c. -, the
age is invariant to and stabilized at the level for which:
1(W1) + L2(W2) = L;−
Employment in each region ﬂuctuates mimicking the local
hock. Expected local employment does not vary with uncertainty.
Summarizing:
Proposition 7: In a dualistic model with perfect mobility and
nstitutional wage ﬁxed in one of the regions, under quantity uncer-
ainty and ex-post location ﬂexibility:
7.1. A unilateral or generalized and positively correlated across
egions increase in risk will result in a rise (decrease) in the
xpected “net” wage if the uncovered region labor demand is con-
ex (concave).
7.2. A unilateral or generalized and perfectly correlated across
egions increase in risk will have no effect on expected local
mployment.
7.3. Perfectly and negatively correlated labor demand shocks
ill result in equal employment movements, neutralizing any
ffect on the expected wages in the economy.
.1.2. Ex-ante location arrangements
Ex-ante location arrangements would be problematic to model
nder perfect mobility when uncertainty in covered region 1 is
taged: unemployment would necessarily be generated. If we con-
ider this a possibility, and allow for (uncorrelated) uncertainty also
n region 2, the general equilibrium for s1 > 0 can be written as:
W1{[q1 + (1 − q1) [L1(W1) −
q1s1
1 − q1
]/L1}
= q2W2(L;− − L1 − s2) + (1 − q2)W2(L;− − L1 +
q2s2
1 − q2
)
Yet, if there is uncertainty in region 2, it may  be worthwhile to
ace unemployment chances in region 1 even when the shock is
ositive:
W1{[L1(W1) + s1]q1 + (1 − q1)[L1(W1) −
q1s1
1 − q1
]}/L1
= W1L1(W1)/L1 =
q2W
2(L;− − L1 − s2) + (1 − q2)W2(L;− − L1 +
q2s2
1 − q2
)
Then we fall into the imperfect mobility environment of the next
ection, IV. We  therefore discard the possibility, consider case 2.a,
nd that only sector 2 is affected by uncertainty. Always:
1 = L1(W1) Administrative Science 20 (2015) 2–20 9
and
E[W2] = q2 W2(L;− − L1(W1) − s2)
+ (1 − q2)W2(L;− − L1(W1) +
q2s2
1 − q2
)
∂E[W2]/∂s2 = q2{W2[L;− − L1(W1) +
q2s2
1 − q2
]′
− W2[L;− − L1(W1) − s2]} (38)
The expected wage in region 2 rises (decreases) with local uncer-
tainty − ∂E[W2]/∂s2 > (<) 0 when s2 > 0, ∂E[W2]/∂s2 < (>) 0 when
s2 < 0 − if W2(L)” > (<) 0, which occurs, because labor demand is
negatively sloped, when L2(W)” > (<) 0 i.e., when labor demand in
region 2 is convex (concave).
As L1(W1) is ﬁxed, also is the labor force. The effect of a rise in
its volatility is nil:
∂E[Li]/∂s2 = ∂E[Li(Wi) + Xi]/∂s2 = 0 (39)
Proposition 8: In a dualistic model with perfect mobility and
institutional wage ﬁxed in one of the regions, subject to quantity
uncertainty and to ex-ante decisions:
8.1. A unilateral increase in risk in the uncovered sector will
result in a rise (decrease) in the expected “net” wage if the uncov-
ered sector labor demand is convex (concave).
8.2. An increase in risk in the covered region will lead to an
imperfect mobility stage.
4.2. Productivity uncertainty
4.2.1. Ex-post ﬂexibility
Consider case 2.a: only one region is affected by uncertainty.
Conclusions differ according to which region is affected by Y.
Either s1 is observed – which occurs with probability q1 – and
L1(W1 − s1) + L2(WC2) = L;− or WC2 = W2[L;− − L1(W1 − s1)]
Then:
∂WC2/∂s1 = L1(W1 − s1)′/L2(WC2)′
= L1(W1 − s1)′W2[L;− − L1(W1 − s1)]′ > 0
Or, with probability (1 – q1), − q1s11−q1 is and:
L1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
) + L2(WD2 ) = L;− or WD2
= W2[L;− − L1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
)]
and
∂WD2 /∂s1 = −
q1
1 − q1
L1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
)′/L2(WD2 )
′
= − q1
1 − q1
L1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
)W2[L;− − L1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
)]′ < 0
As ∂WC2/∂s1 > 0 (and/or ∂W
D
2 /∂s1 < 0),  for s1 > (<)0,
WC2 > (<)W
D
2 . On average:
∂E[W2]/∂s1 = q1∂WC2/∂s1 + (1 − q1)∂WD2 /∂s1
= q1[L1(W1 − s1)′/L2(WC2)′ − L1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
)′/L2(WD2 )
′]= q1{L1(W1 − s1)′W2[L;− − L1(W1 − s1)]′
−L1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
)′W2[L;− − L1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
)]′}
(40)
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welfare, W1 L1 + (W2 + a) L2 = (W2 + a) L;−, will always increase
with a.)
Proposition 11:  11.1. Consider a dualistic model with imperfect0 A.P. Martins / Journal of Economics, Finan
∂E[W2]/∂s1 > (<) 0 when s1 > 0 − ∂E[W2]/∂s1 < (>) 0 when s1 <
 −, if L1(W)’ W2[L;− −L1(W)]’ decreases (increases) with W.  That
ccurs when L1(W)” / L1(W)’ < (>) L1(W)’ W2[L;− −L1(W)]” / W2[L;−
L1(W)]’ – when the symmetric of the Arrow-Pratt measure of
isk-aversion of region 1’s labor demand is smaller (larger) than
he same measure for the uncovered region inverse demand multi-
lied by the covered region labor demand slope. That is equivalent
 using Remark 4 of section VII below – to have W1(L)” / W1(L)’ +
2[L;− −L1(W)]” / W2[L;− −L1(W)]’ < (>) 0.
∂E[L1(W1 − Y)]/∂s1 = −∂E[L2(W2)]/∂s1
= −q1L2(WC2)′∂WC2/∂s1 + (1 − q1)L2(WD2 )′∂WD2 /∂s1
= q1[L1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
)′ − L1(W1 − s1)′]
(41)
∂E[L1(W1 – Y)]/∂s1 > (<) 0 when s1 > (<) 0 if L1(W)” > 0: expected
mployment rises in region 1 if its local labor demand is convex.
When 2 is the affected region: either s2 is observed – which
ccurs with probability q2 – and
1(W1) + L2(WC2 − s2) = L;−
Then:
WC2/∂s2 = 1 > 0
Or, with probability (1 – q2), − q2s21−q2 is and:
1(W1) + L2(WD2 +
q2s2
1 − q2
) = L;−
nd
WD2 /∂s2 = −
q2
1 − q2
< 0
As ∂WC2/∂s2 > 0 (and/or W
D
2 /∂s2 < 0),  for s2 > (<)0,
C
2 > (<)W
D
2 . On average:
E[W2]/∂s2 = q2∂WC2/∂s2 + (1 − q2)∂WD2 /∂s2 = 0 (42)
As W1 is ﬁxed, also L1(W1) and labor force allocation is invariant
o uncertainty:
E[Li]/∂s = 0 (43)
Given this, the effect of compound uncertainty in both sectors
 that is, if we staged 2.b or 2.c. – we always conclude about a rise
n risk as for expected wages or employment after the unilateral
hange in s1.
Proposition 9: In a dualistic model with perfect mobility and
nstitutional wage ﬁxed in one of the regions, under productivity
ncertainty and ex-post location ﬂexibility:
9.1. A unilateral increase in wage dispersion in the uncovered
egion will have no effect on expected wage or local employment.
9.2. A unilateral increase in risk in the covered region or gener-
lized and perfectly correlated increase in productivity dispersion
cross regions will result in a rise (decrease) in the expected wage
f the sum of the symmetric of the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk-
version of the inverse labor demands is negative (positive); in a
ise (fall) in the covered sector’s employment if the covered sector
abor demand is convex (concave).
.2.2. Ex-ante location arrangements
Again, as we are assuming perfect mobility, that ex-ante loca-
ion decisions are ﬁxed becomes an awkward hypothesis: we  would
lways have access to the other sector’s jobs – then we could
ecover the ex-post mobility result.
The general equilibrium for s1 > 0 can be written as:
1[q1 + (1 − q1)L1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
)]/L1 = W2(L;− − L1) Administrative Science 20 (2015) 2–20
If it becomes worthwhile to face unemployment chances in sec-
tor 1 even when the shock is positive:
W1[L
1(W1 − s1)q1 + (1 − q1)L1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
)]/L1 = W2(L;− − L1)
Then we  fall into the imperfect mobility environment of the next
section, IV.
Consider then case 2.a and that only region 2 is affected by
uncertainty. As
L1 = L1(W1)
productivity uncertainty has no effect on expected outcomes,
once it only affects the uncovered region wage and in an additive
fashion.
Proposition 10:  In a dualistic model with perfect mobility and
institutional wage ﬁxed in one of the regions, subject to productiv-
ity uncertainty and to ex-ante decisions:
10.1. A unilateral increase in risk in the uncovered region will
have no effect on employment allocation or expected wage.
10.2. An increase in risk in the covered region will lead to an
imperfect mobility stage.
5. Partial coverage and imperfect mobility - The
Harris-Todaro model
Assume 3.b, 4.b and 5.a. of section I. The wage in the two  regions
differs. In region 1, the net wage is ﬁxed at level W1.
As region 2’s wage is free, it will decrease till all the local labor
force is employed:
L;−2 = L2 = L2(W2)
However, to have access to wage W1, people have to locate there,
or to specialize if we  are addressing industry rather than regional
afﬁliation – implying that unemployment will be generated in the
region. There will be labor force ﬂows till
W1 x Probability of Employment in region 1 = W2 + a
That is, in the long run we  expect that:
W1L
1(W1)/L;
−
1 = W1L1(W1)/[L;− − L2(W2)] = W2 + a (44)
or
W1L1(W1) = (W2 + a) [L;− − L2(W2)]
= [W2(L;− − L;−1 ) + a]L;−1
∂W2/∂a  = −[L;− − L2(W2)]/[L;− − L2(W2) − (W2 + a)L2(W2)] < 0
(45)
∂L;−1 /∂a = −L;−1 /[W2(L;− − L;−1 ) + a − L;−1 W2(L;− − L;−1 )′] < 0
(46)
∂[W1L1 + W2L2]/∂a = [L2(W2) + W2L2(W2)′]∂W2/∂a (47)
the wage bill – and the expected wage in the economy – will
increase (decrease) with a if the absolute value of the elasticity
of labor demand in region 2 is larger than 1. (Aggregate workers’mobility in the short-run. The equilibrium wage in the second sec-
tor may  be higher or lower than the free market equilibrium, and
there will be unemployment in the institutional sector or urban
region.
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−L2(WB2)′(WB2 + a)/[L;− − L2(WB2) +
q2s2
1 − q2
− (WB2 + a)L2(WB2)′]}A.P. Martins / Journal of Economics, Finan
11.2. An increase in local externalities favouring the uncovered
covered) region will attract the labor force to the latter and depress
he local (raise the uncovered regions) wage. The average wage in
he economy will increase (decrease) if the absolute value of the
lasticity of labor demand in covered region exceeds (is smaller
han) 1.
.1. Quantity uncertainty
.1.1. Ex-post ﬂexibility
Let us consider 2.a. Assume X2 = 0: uncertainty only afﬂicts
overed region 1’s employment. Then:
Either s1 is observed – which occurs with probability q1 – and
W1[L
1(W1) + s1] = (WA2 + a) [L;− − L2(WA2)]
= [W2(L;− − L;−A1 ) + a]L;−A1
∂L;−A1 /∂s1 = W1/[W2(L;− − L;−A1 ) + a − W2(L;− − L;−A1 )′L;−A1 ] > 0
∂WA2/∂s1 = W1/[L;− − L2(WA2) − (WA2 + a)L2(WA2)] > 0
Or, with probability (1 – q1), − q1s11−q1 is and:
W1[L
1(W1) −
q1s1
1 − q1
] = (WB2 + a) [L;− − L2(WB2)]
= [W2(L;− − L;−B1 ) + a]L;−B1
∂L;−B1 /∂s1 = −
q1
1 − q1
W1/[W
2(L;− − L;−B1 )
+a − W2(L;− − L;−B1 )′L;−B1 ] < 0
∂WB2/∂s1 = −
q1
1 − q1
W1/[L;− − L2(WB2) − (WB2 + a)L2(WB2)] < 0
As ∂WA2/∂s1 > 0 (and/or ∂W
B
2/∂s1 < 0),  for s1 > (<)0,
A
2 > (<)W
B
2. On average:
∂E[W2]/∂s1 = q1∂WA2/∂s1 + (1 − q1)∂WB2/∂s1
= q1{[L2(WA2) + (WA2 + a)L2(WA2)′] − [L2(WB2)
+(WB2 + a)L2(WB2)′]}/
{[L;− − L2(WA2) (WA2 + a)L2(WA2)] [L;− − L2(WB2)
−(WB2 + a)L2(WB2)′]}
(48)
For s1 > (<)0,  W
A
2 > (<)W
B
2 and ∂E[W2]/∂s1 > (<) 0 if [L
2(W)
 (W + a) L2(W)’] rises with W.  Around a = 0, that occurs when
he uncovered region wage bill function, [W L2(W)], is convex in
. E[W2] decreases with uncertainty (rises with s1 if positive,
ecreases if negative) when the uncovered region’s wage bill is
oncave in W.
As ∂L;−1 A/∂s1 > 0 (and/or ∂L;
−
1 B/∂s1 < 0),  for s1 > (<
0, L;−1 A > (<) L;
−
1 B. On average:
∂E[L;−1 ]/∂s1 = q1∂L;−A1 /∂s1 + (1 − q1)∂L;−B1 /∂s1
= q1W1{[W2(L;− − L;−B1 ) − W2(L;− − L;−B1 )L;−B1 ]
−[W2(L;− − L;−A1 ) − W2(L;− − L;−A1 )L;−A1 ]}/
{[W2(L;− − L;−A1 ) + a − W2(L;− − L;−A1 )L;−A1 ][W2(L;− − L;−B1 )
+a − W2(L;− − L;−B1 )′L;−B1 ]}
= −q1W1{L2(WA2)′/[L;− − L2(WA2) − (WA2 + a)L2(WA2)]
2 B ′ − 2 B B 2 B ′
(49)−L (W2) /[L; − L (W2) − (W2 + a)L (W2) ]}
= q1W1[1/{[L;− − L2(WB2)]/L2(WB2)′ + (WB2 + a)}
−1/{[L;− − L2(WA2)]/L2(WA2)′ + (WA2 + a)}] Administrative Science 20 (2015) 2–20 11
For s1 > (<)0,  L;
−A
1 > (<)  L;
−B
1 and ∂E[L;
−
1 ]/∂s1 > (<)0 if
W2(L;− − L) − W2(L;− − L)’ L decreases with L. That occurs
when the uncovered region wage times the other region’s employ-
ment, [W2(L;− − L) L], is concave in L. E[L;−1] decreases with
uncertainty (rises with s1 if positive, decreases if negative) when
[W2(L;− − L) L] is convex in L. Referring to L;−A2 < (>)L;−B2 if s1 >
(<)0,  ∂E[L;−1 ]/∂s1 > (<)0.  if W
2(L) − W2(L)’ (L;− − L) increases
(decreases) with L – if [W2(L) (L;− − L)] is concave (convex) in L.
Equivalently, around a = 0, L;−1 will rise (decrease) with uncer-
tainty if [L;− − L2(W)] / L2(W)’ + W increases (decreases) with
W.
Let now be region 2 suffering uncertainty and X1 = 0. For s2 –
which occurs with probability q2 – and
∂L;−A1 /∂s2 = W2(L;− − L;−A1 − s2)′ L;−A1 /
[W2(L;− − L;−A1 − s2) + a − W2(L;− − L;−A1 − s2)′L;−1 A] < 0
∂WA2/∂s2 = (WA2 + a)/[L;− − L2(WA2) − s2 − (WA2 + a) L2(WA2)′] > 0
With probability (1 – q2), − q2s21−q2 is observed and:
∂L;−B1 /∂s2 = −
q2
1 − q2
W2(L;− − L;−B1 +
q2s2
1 − q2
)′ L;−B1 /
[W2(L;− − L;−B1 −
q2s2
1 − q2
) + a − W2(L;− − L;−B1 +
q2s2
1 − q2
)′L;−B1 ] > 0
∂WB2/∂s2 = −
q2s2
1 − q2
(WB2 + a)/[L;− − L2(WB2) +
q2s2
1 − q2
−(WB2 + a)L2(WB2)] < 0
As ∂WA2/∂s2 > 0 (and/or W
B
2/∂s2 < 0),  for s2 > (<)0,
WA2 > (<)W
B
2. On average, around a = 0:
∂E[W2]/∂s2 = q2∂W2A/∂s2 + (1 − q2)∂WB2/∂s2
= q2{[L2(WA2)′ − W1L1(W1)/(WA2)2] − [L2(WB2)′
−W1L1(W1)/(WB2)2]}/
{[W1L1(W1)/(WA2)2 − L2(WA2)′][W1L1(W1)/(WB2)2 − L2(WB2)′]}
(50)
For s2 > (<)0,  W
A
2 > (<)W
B
2 and ∂E[W2]/∂s2 > (<) 0 if L
2(W)’−
W1L1(W1)/W2 rises with W.  That occurs when the total wage bill
divided by the uncovered region’s wage is convex in it – that is, if
d2{[W1 L1(W1) + W L2(W)] / W}/dW2 > 0. E[W2] decreases with
uncertainty (rises with s2 if positive, decreases if negative) when
that ratio is concave.
As ∂L;−A1 /∂s2 < 0 (and/or ∂L;
−B
1 /∂s2 > 0),  for s2 > (<
) 0, L;−A1 < (>)L;
−B
1 . On average:
∂E[L;−1 ]/∂s2 = q2∂L;−A1 /∂s2 + (1 − q2)∂L;−B1 /∂s2
= −q2{W2(L;− − L;−B1 +
q2s2
1 − q2
) L;−B1 /[W
2(L;− − L;−B1 +
q2s2
1 − q2
)
+a − W2(L;− − L;−B1 +
q2s2
1 − q2
)′L;−B1 ]
−W2(L;− − L;−A1 − s2)′L;−A1 /[W2(L;− − L;−A1 − s2)
+a − W2(L;− − L;−A1 − s2)L;−A1 ]} = −∂E[L2]/∂s2
= −[q2L2(WA2)′∂WA2/∂s2 + (1 − q2)L2(WB2)′WB2/∂s2
= −q2{L2(WA2)′(WA2 + a)/[L;− − L2(WA2) − s2 − (WA2 + a)L2(WA2)]
(51)= q2[1/{W1L1(W1)/[(WB2 + a)2L2(WB2)′] − 1}
−1/{W1L1(W1)/[(WA2 + a)2L2(WA2)′] − 1}]
1 ce and
0
u
i
–
b
i
a
d
d
W1[L
1(W1) −
qs
1 − q ] = (W
B
2 + a) [L;− − L2(WB2) −
qs
1 − q ]
= [W2(L;− − L;−B1 −
qs
1 − q ) + a] L;
−B
1
∂WB2/∂s = −
q
1 − q (W1 − W
B
2 − a)/[L;− − L2(WB2) −
qs
1 − q
−(WB2 + a) L2(WB2)] < 0
−B q 2 −B qs −B2 A.P. Martins / Journal of Economics, Finan
For s2 > (<)0,  W
A
2 > (<)W
B
2 and, around a = 0, ∂E[L2]/∂s2 > (<)
 if L2(W)’ W2 rises (decreases) with W.
Taking 2.b., and allowing for perfectly and positively correlated
ncertainty we derive that:
Either s is observed – which occurs with probability q – and
W1[L
1(W1) + s] = (WA2 + a)[L;− − L2(WA2) − s]
= [W2(L;− − L;−A1 − s) + a]L;−A1
Then:
∂WA2/∂s  = (W1 + WA2 + a)/[L;− − L2(WA2)
−s − (WA2 + a)L2(WA2)] > 0
∂L;−1 A/∂s = [W1 + W2(L;− − L;−1 A − s)L;−1 A]/
[W2(L;− − L;−1 A − s) + a − W2(L;− − L;−1 A − s)′L;−1 A]
∂L;−1 A/∂s > (<)0 if L
1(W1) + s < (>)[W2(L;− − L;−1 A − s)′ + a]/
W2(L;− − L;−1 A − s)′.
Or, with probability (1 – q), − qs1−q is and:
W1[L
1(W1) −
qs
1 − q ] = (W
B
2 + a)[L;− − L2(WB2) +
qs
1 − q ]
= [W2(L;− − L;−B1 +
qs
1 − q ) + a]L;
−B
1
∂WB2/∂s  = −
q
1 − q (W1 + W
B
2 + a)/[L;− − L2(WB2) +
qs
1 − q
−(WB2 + a)L2(WB2)′] < 0
∂L;−B1 /∂s = −
q
1 − q [W1 + W
2(L;− − L;−B1 +
qs
1 − q )L;
−B
1 ]/
[W2(L;− − L;−B1 +
qs
1 − q ) + a − W
2(L;− − L;−B1 +
qs
1 − q )L;
−B
1 ]
∂L;−B1 /∂s < (>)0 if L
1(W1) −
qs
1 − q < (>)[W
2(L;− − L;−B1
+ qs
1 − q ) + a]/W
2(L;− − L;−B1 +
qs
1 − q )
′.
As ∂WA2/∂s  > 0 (and/or ∂W
B
2/∂s < 0),  for s > (<) 0,
WA2 > (<)W
B
2. On average:
∂E[W2]/∂s = q∂WA2/∂s + (1 − q)∂WB2/∂s
= q{(W1 + WA2 + a)/[L;− − L2(WA2) − s − (WA2 + a)L2(WA2)′]
−(W1 + WB2 + a)/[L;− − L2(WB2) +
qs
1 − q − (W
B
2 + a) L2(WB2)′]}
= q([W1/(WA2 + a) + 1]/{W1[L1(W1) + s]/
(WA2 + a) 2 − L2(WA2)′}
−[W1/(WB2 + a) + 1]/{W1[L1(W1) −
qs
1 − q ]/
(WB2 + a) 2 − L2(WB2)′})
(52)
For s > (<)0,  WA2 > (<)W
B
2 and ∂E[W2]/∂s > (<) 0 if but not only
f [L2(W)  + (W + a) L2(W)’] rises with W.  Around a = 0, that occurs
 E[W2] rises with uncertainty - when the uncovered region wage
ill function, [W L2(W)], is convex.
For s > (<)0,  WA2 > (<)W
B
2 and ∂E[W2]/∂s < (>) 0 around a = 0f but not only if W1L1(W1)/W2 − L2(W)’ rises with W.  That occurs,
nd E[W2] decreases with uncertainty when the total wage bill
ivided by the uncovered region’s wage is concave in it – that is, if
2{[W1 L1(W1) + W L2(W)] / W}/dW2 < 0. Administrative Science 20 (2015) 2–20
On average:
∂E[L;−1 ]/∂s = q∂L;−A1 /∂s  + (1 − q)∂L;−B1 /∂s
= q{[W1 + W2(L;− − L;−B1 − s)′L;−B1 ]/[W2(L;− − L;−B1 − s)
+a − W2(L;− − L;−B1 − s)L;−B1 ]
−[W1 + W2(L;− − L;−A1 − s)′L;−A1 ]/[W2(L;− − L;−A1 − s)
+a − W2(L;− − L;−A1 − s)′L;−A1 ]}
= −q{(W1 + WA2 + a) L2(WA2)′/[L;− − L2(WA2)
−s − (WA2 + a) L2(WA2)′]
−(W1 + WB2 + a)L2(WB2)′/[L;− − L2(WB2) +
qs
1 − q
−(WB2 + a) L2(WB2)′]}
= −q[(W1 + WA2 + a)/{[L;− − L2(WA2) − s]/L2(WA2)′ − (WA2 + a)}
−(W1 + WB2 + a)/{[L;− − L2(WA2) +
qs
1 − q ]/L
2(WB2)(W
B
2 + a)}]
= −q[(W1 + WA2 + a)/{W1[L1(W1) + s]/
[(WA2 + a) L2(WA2)′] − (WA2 + a)}
−(W1 + WB2 + a)/{W1[L1(W1) −
qs
1 − q ]/
[(WB2 + a) L2(WA2)′] − (WB2 + a)}]
(53)
For s > (<)0,  WA2 > (<)W
B
2; ∂E[L2]/∂s > (<)0 and L2 rises with
uncertainty if but not only if [(W + a) L2(W)’] rises with W.
Finally, for 2.c., and with perfectly negatively correlated uncer-
tainty in the regions we derive that:
Either s is observed – which occurs with probability q – and
W1[L
1(W1) + s] = (WA2 + a)[L;− − L2(WA2) + s]
= [W2(L;− − L;−A1 + s) + a] L;−A1
Then:
∂WA2/∂s  = (W1 − WA2 − a)/[L;− − L2(WA2 − a)
+s − (WA2 + a) L2(WA2)] > 0
∂L;−1 A/∂s  = [W1 − W2(L;− − L;−1 A + s)L;−1 A]/
[W2(L;− − L;−1 A + s) + a − W2(L;− − L;−1 A + s)L;−1 A] > 0
Or, with probability (1 – q), − qs1−q is and:∂L;1 /∂s  = −1 − q [W1 − W (L;
− − L;1 − 1 − q )
′L;1 ]/
[W2(L;− − L;−B1 −
qs
1 − q ) + a − W
2(L;− − L;−B1 −
qs
1 − q ) L;
−B
1 ] > 0
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As ∂WA2/∂s  > 0 (and/or ∂W
B
2/∂s < 0),  for s > (<) 0,
WA2 > (<)W
B
2. On average:
∂E[W2]/∂s = q∂WA2/∂s  + (1 − q)∂WB2/s
= q{(W1 − WA2 − a)/[L;− − L2(WA2) + s − (WA2 + a) L2(WA2)]
−(W1 − WB2 − a)/[L;− − L2(WB2) −
qs
1 − q − (W
B
2 + a) L2(WB2)]}
= q{[W1/(WA2 + a) − 1]/{W1[L1(W1) + s]/
(WA2 + a) 2 − L2(WA2)′}
−[W1/(WB2 + a) − 1]/{W1[L1(W1) −
qs
1 − q ]/
(WB2 + a) 2 − L2(WB2)′})
(54)
For s > (<) 0, WA2 > (<)W
B
2 and ∂E[W2]/∂s < (>) 0 if but not only
f [L2(W)  + (W + a) L2(W)’] decreases with W.  Around a = 0, that
ccurs when the uncovered sector wage bill function, [W L2(W)], is
oncave. Or:
For s > (<)  0, WA2 > (<)W
B
2 and ∂E[W2]/∂s < (>) 0 around a = 0
f but not only if W1L1(W1)/W2−L2(W)’ rises with W.  That occurs,
nd E[W2] decreases with uncertainty if but not only if the total
age bill divided by the uncovered region’s wage is concave in it –
hat is, if d2{[W1 L1(W1) + W L2(W)] / W}/dW2 < 0.
∂E[L;−1 ]/∂s = q ∂L;−1 A/∂s  + (1 − q)∂L;−1 B/∂s
= q{[W1 − W2(L;− − L;−1 A + s)L;−1 A]/[W2(L;− − L;−1 A + s)
+a − W2(L;− − L;−1 A + s)′L;−1 A]
−[W1 − W2(L;− − L;−1 B −
qs
1 − q )L;
−
1 B]/[W
2(L;− − L;−1 B −
qs
1 − q )
+a − W2(L;− − L;−1 B −
qs
1 − q )
′L;−1 B]}
= −q{(W1 − WA2 − a)L2(WA2)/[L;− − L2(WA2)
+s(WA2 + a) L2(WA2)]
−(W1 − WB2 − a) L2(WB2)/[L;− − L2(WB2)
− qs
1 − q (W
B
2 + a) L2(WB2)′]}
= −q[(W1 − WA2 − a)/{W1[L1(W1) + s]/
[(WA2 + a) L2(WA2)′] − (WA2 + a)}
−(W1 − WB2 − a)/{W1[L1(W1) −
qs
1 − q ]/
[(WB2 + a) L2(WB2)′] − (WB2 + a)}]
(55)
There will be a composition of effects but sign directions are not
o deﬁnite.
Proposition 12: Consider a dualistic model with imperfect
obility in the short-run. Under quantity uncertainty and ex-post
ocation ﬂexibility:
12.1. A unilateral increase in risk in the covered sector will result
n a rise (decrease) in the expected “net” wage if the uncovered
ector’s wage bill is convex (concave). Expected local labor force
ncreases (decreases) with uncertainty if the inverse demand of the
ncovered sector multiplied by excess employment relative to total
upply is concave (convex) in L.
12.2. A unilateral increase in risk in the uncovered sector will
esult in a rise (decrease) in the expected wage if the total wage bill
ivided by the uncovered sector’s wage is convex (concave) in it.
xpected local labor force increases (decreases) with uncertainty
f the slope of the uncovered sector’s demand multiplied by the
quare of the wage increases (decreases) with the latter.
12.3. A perfectly and positively correlated across regions
ncrease in risk will result in a rise in the expected wage if but Administrative Science 20 (2015) 2–20 13
not only if the uncovered sector’s wage bill is convex; a fall if but
not only if the total wage bill divided by the uncovered sector’s
wage is concave in it. Expected labor force in the uncovered sector
increases with uncertainty if the slope of the uncovered sector’s
demand multiplied by the wage rate increases with it.
12.4. A perfectly and negatively correlated across regions
increase in risk will result in a decrease in the expected wage if
but not only if the uncovered sector’s wage bill is concave; or if
but not only if the total wage bill divided by the uncovered sector’s
wage is concave in it.
5.1.2. Ex-ante location arrangements
The expected wage bill in region 1 is ﬁxed. Hence, only the
uncertainty affecting region 2’s wage has an impact on the labor
force allocation:
W1L
1(W1) = [q2W2(L;− − L;−1 − s2) + (1 − q2)
× W2(L;− − L;−1 +
q2s2
1 − q2
) + a]L;−1
Then:
∂L;−1 /∂s2 = q2[W2(L;− − L;−1 − s2) − W2(L;− − L;−1 +
q2s2
1 − q2
)′]L;−1 /
{[q2 W2(L;− − L;−1 − s2) + (1 − q2)W2 (L;− − L;−1 +
q2s2
1 − q2
)]
−[q2 W2(L;− − L;−1 − s2) + (1 − q2)
× W2(L;− − L;−1 +
q2s2
1 − q2
)′] L;−1 + a}
(56)
For s2 > (<)  0, W
2(L;− − L;−1 − s2)′ > (<)W2(L;− − L;−1 +
q2s2
1−q2 )
′ and ∂L;−1 /∂s2 > (<)  0 and ∂L;
−
2 /∂s2 < (>) 0 − if W2(L)’
decreases (rises) with L: when the uncovered region inverse
demand is concave (convex) in L – and the labor demand function
L2(W), is concave (convex) in W.
∂E[W2]/∂s2 = −[W1 L1(W1)/L;−21 ] ∂L;−1 /∂s2 (57)
The expected wage will move in opposite direction to the labor
force in the covered region.
Proposition 13:  With multiple coverage and imperfect mobility,
quantity uncertainty with ex-ante location decisions.
13.1. A unilateral increase in risk in the covered region will have
no effect on employment allocation or expected wage.
13.2. An increase in risk in the uncovered region will result in an
increase (decrease) in the local labor force and of the expected wage
in the economy if the uncovered region labor demand is convex
(concave).
5.2. Productivity uncertainty
5.2.1. Ex-post ﬂexibility
In general, the equilibrium satisﬁes:
W1L
1(W1 − Y1) = (W2 + a)[L;− − L2(W2 − Y2)]= [W2(L;− − L;−1 ) + Y2 + a]L;−1
Let Y2 = 0: uncertainty only afﬂicts covered region 1’s employ-
ment. Then:
1 ce and
(
(
A
f
(
w
L
i
W
i
t
i
u
w
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Either s1 is observed – which occurs with probability q1 – and
W1L
1(W1 − s1) = (WC2 + a)[L;− − L2(WC2)]
= [W2(L;− − L;−1 C) + a]L;−1
∂L;−1 C/∂s1 = −L1(W1 − s1)′W1/[W2(L;− − L;−1 C)
+a − W2(L;− − L;−1 C)′ L;−1 C] > 0
∂WC2/∂s1 = −W1L1(W1 − s1)/[L;− − L2(WC2)
−(WC2 + a) L2(WC2)′] > 0
Or, with probability (1 – q1), − q1s11−q1 is and:
W1L
1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
) = (WC2 + a)[L;− − L2(WC2)]
= [W2(L;− − L;−1 C) + a]L;−1
∂L;−1 D/∂s1 =
q1
1 − q1
W1L
1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
)′/
[W2(L;− − L;−1 D) + a − W2(L;− − L;−1 D)′ L;−1 D] < 0
∂WD2 /∂s1 =
q1
1 − q1
W1L
1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
)′/
[L;− − L2(WD2 ) (WD2 + a) L2(WD2 )′ ] < 0
As ∂WC2/∂s1 > 0 (and/or ∂W
D
2 /∂s1 < 0),  for s1 > (<) 0, W
C
2 >
<)WD2 . On average:
∂E[W2]/∂s1 = q1∂WC2/∂s1 + (1 − q1)∂WD2 /∂s1
= q1W1{L1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
)/[L;− − L2(WD2 ) − (WD2 + a) L2(WD2 )]
−L1(W1 − s1)′/[L;− − L2(WC2) − (WC2 + a) L2(WC2)′]}
(58)
For s1 > (<) 0, W
C
2 > (<)W
D
2 and ∂E[W2]/∂s1 > (<) 0 if [L
2(W)  +
W + a) L2(W)’] rises with W – provided L1(W1) is not too concave.
round a = 0, that occurs when the uncovered region wage bill
unction, [W L2(W)], is convex. E[W2] decreases with uncertainty
rises with s1 if positive, decreases if negative) when the uncovered
age bill is concave – provided L1(W1) is not too convex.
As ∂L;−C1 /∂s1 > 0 (and/or ∂L;
−D
1 /∂s1 < 0),  for s1 > (<)  0,
;−C1 > (<)  L;
−D
1 . On average:
∂E[L;−1 ]/∂s1 = q1 ∂L;−C1 /∂s1 + (1 − q1)∂L;−D1 /∂s1
= q1W1{L1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
)′/[W2(L;− − L;−D1 )
+a − W2(L;− − L;−D1 )′L;−D1 ]
−L1(W1 − s1)′/[W2(L;− − L;−C1 ) + a − W2(L;− − L;−C1 )′L;−C1 ]}
(59)
For s1 > (<) 0, L;
−C
1 > (<) L;
−D
1 and ∂E[L;
−
1 ]/∂s1 > (<) 0
f W2(L ; − − L) − W2(L ; − − L) ’ L decreases with L; or
2(L) − W2(L) ’ (L ; − − L) increases with L− provided that L1W1
s not too concave. That occurs when the uncovered region wage
imes the other region’s employment [W2(L ; − − L) L], is convex
n L− if W2(L) (L ; − − L) is concave in L. E [L;−1 ] decreases with
ncertainty (decreases with s1 if positive, increases if negative)
hen [W2(L ; − − L) L] is concave in L− if W2(L) (L ; − − L) is convex
n L− provided L1 (W1) is not too convex. Administrative Science 20 (2015) 2–20
Let now be region 2 suffering uncertainty and Y1 = 0. For s2−
which occurs with probability q2− and
W1L
1(W1) = (WC2 + a) [L;− − L2(WC2 − s2)]
= [W2(L;− − L;−C1 ) + s2 + a] L;−C1
∂L;−C1 /∂s2 = −L;−C1 /
[W2(L;− − L;−C1 ) + s2 + a − W2(L;− − L;−C1 )′ L;−C1 ] < 0
∂WC2/∂s2 = −(WC2 + a) L2(WC2 − s2)′/
[L;− − L2(WC2 − s2) − (WC2 + a) L2(WC2 − s2)′]
= −[W1L1(W1)/L;−1 C2] ∂L;−C1 /∂s2
= [W1L1(W1)/L;−C1 ]/[W2(L;− − L;−C1 ) + s2 + a
−W2(L;− − L;−C1 )′L;−C1 ]
= 1/{1 − W2(L;− − L;−C1 )′L;−C21 /[W1L1(W1)]} > 0
With probability (1 − q2), − q2s21−q2 is observed and:
W1L
1(W1) = (WD2 + a) [L;− − L2(WD2 +
q2s2
1 − q2
)]
= [W2(L;− − L;−D1 ) −
q2s2
1 − q2
+ a]L;−D1
∂L;−D1 /∂s2 =
q2
1 − q2
L;−D1 /[W
2(L;− − L;−D1 ) −
q2s2
1 − q2
+a − W2(L;− − L;−D1 )′L;−D1 ] > 0
∂W2∂D/s2 =
q2
1 − q2
(WD2 + a)L2(WD2 +
q2s2
1 − q2
)′/
[L;− − L2(WD2 +
q2s2
1 − q2
) − (WD2 + a)L2(WD2 +
q2s2
1 − q2
)′]
= − q2
1 − q2
1/{1 − W2(L;− − L;−D1 )′L;−D21 /[W1L1(W1)]}  < 0
As ∂WC2/∂s2 > 0 (and/or ∂W
D
2 /∂s2 < 0), for s2 > (<)0,
WC2 > (<)W
D
2 . On average:
∂E[W2]/∂s2 = q2∂WC2/∂s2 + (1 − q2)∂WD2 /∂s2
= q2{(WD2 + a)L2(WD2 +
q2s2
1 − q2
)′/
[L;− − L2(WD2 +
q2s2
1 − q2
) − (WD2 + a) L2(WD2 )′]
−(WC2 + a) L2(WC2 − s2)′
/[L;− − L2(WC2 − s2) − (WC2 + a)L2(WC2 − s2)′]} =
q2[1/{[L;− − L2(WD2 +
q2s2
1 − q2
)]/
[(WD2 + a)L2(WD2 +
q2s2
1 − q2
)′] − 1}−
1/{[L;− − L2(WC2 − s2)]/[(WC2 + a)L2(WC2 − s2)′] − 1}] =
q2(1/{W1L1(W1)/[(WD2 + a) 2L2(WD2 +
q2s2
1 − q2
)′] − 1}−
1/{W1L1(W1)/[(WC2 + a) 2L2(WC2 − s2)′] − 1})
= q2(1/{1 − W2(L;− − L;−C1 )′L;−C21 /[W1L1(W1)]}
−1/{1 − W2(L;− − L;−D1 )′L;−D21 /[W1L1(W1)]}
(60)
For s2 > (<) 0, L;
−C
1 < (>)L;
−D
1 and ∂E[W2]/∂s2 > (<)0 if[W2(L ; − − L) ’ L2] decreases with L− or if [W2(L)′(L;− − L)2]
increases with L . E[W2] decreases with uncertainty (decreases
with s2 if positive, increases if negative) when [W2(L ; − − L) ’ L2]
increases with L − [W2(L)′(L;− − L)2] decreases with L.
ce and
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As ∂L;−C1 /∂s2 < 0 (and/or ∂L;
−D
1 /∂s2 > 0),  for s2 > (0 <)  0,
;−C1 < (>) L;
−D
1 . On average:
∂E[L;−1 ]/∂s2 = q2∂L;−C1 /∂s2 + (1 − q2)∂L; −D1 /∂s2
= q2{L;−D1 /[W2(L;− − L;−D1 ) −
q2s2
1 − q2
+ a − W2(L;− − L;−D1 )′L;−D1 ]
−L;−C1 /[W2(L;− − L;−C1 ) + s2 + a − W2(L;− − L;−C1 − s2)′L;−C1 ]}
= q2(1/{[W2(L;− − L;−D1 ) −
q2s2
1 − q2
+ a]/L;−D1
−W2(L;− − L;−D1 )′}
−1/{[W2(L;− − L;−C1 ) + s2 + a]/L;−C1 − W2(L;− − L;−C1 )′]})
= q2(1/{W1L1(W1)/L;−D21 − W2(L;− − L;−D1 )′}−
1/{[W1L1(W1)/L;−C21 − W2(L;− − L;−C1 )′]})
(61)
For s2 > (<) 0, L;
−C
1 < (>)L;
−D
1 and ∂E[L;
−
1 ]/∂s2 > (<)  0 if W1
1(W1)/L
2 − W2(L;− − L)′ decreases with L. That occurs when
he ratio [W1L1(W1) − W2(L ; − − L)L]/L is convex in L, i.e.,
2{[W1L1(W1) − W2(L;− − L)L]/L}/dL2 > 0. E[L;−1 ] decreases
ith uncertainty (rises with s2 if positive, decreases if negative)
hen that ratio is concave.
Taking 2.b., and allowing for perfectly and positively correlated
ncertainty we derive that:
Either s is observed – which occurs with probability q – and
W1L
1(W1 − s) = (WC2 + a)
[
L;− − L2WC2 − s
]
=
[
W2(L;− − L;−C1 ) + s + a
]
L;−C1
Then:
∂WC2/∂s  = −[W1L1(W1 − s)′ + (WC2 + a) L2(WC2 − s)′]/
[L;− − L2(WC2 − s) − (WC2 + a) L2(WC2 − s)′] > 0
∂L;−C1 /∂s  = −[W1L1(W1 − s)′ + L;−C1 ]/
[W2(L;− − L;−C1 ) + s + a − W2(L;− − L;−C1 )′L;−C1 ]
Or, with probability (1 − q), − qs1−q is and:
W1L
1(W1 +
qs
1 − q = (W
D
2 + a) [L;− − L2(WD2 +
qs
1 − q )]
= [W2(L;− − L;−D1 ) −
qs
1 − q + a]L;
−D
1
∂WD2 /∂s  =
qs
1 − q [W1L
1(W1 +
qs
1 − q )
′ + (WD2 + a)L2(WD2 +
qs
1 − q )
′]/
[L;− − L2(WD2 +
qs
1 − q ) − (W
D
2 + a) L2(WD2 +
qs
1 − q )
′] < 0
∂L;−D1 /∂s  =
qs
1 − q [W1L
1(W1 +
qs
1 − q )
′ + L;−D1 ]/
[W2(L;− − L;−D1 ) −
qs
1 − q + a − W
2(L;− − L;−D1 )′L;−D1 ]
As ∂WC2/∂s  > 0 (and/or W
D
2 /∂s  < 0),  for s > (<)0, W
C
2 > (<)
D
2 . On average:
∂E[W2]/∂s = q∂WC2/∂s  + (1 − q)∂WD2 /∂s
= q{[W1L1(W1 +
qs
1 − q )
′ + (WD2 + a)L2(WD2 +
qs
1 − q )
′]/
[L;− − L2(WD + qs − (WD + a)L2(WD + qs )′] (62)2 1 − q 2 2 1 − q
−[W1L1(W1 − s)′ + (WC2 + a)L2(WC2 − s)′]/
[L;− − L2(WC2 − s) − (WC2 + a)L2(WC2 − s)′]} Administrative Science 20 (2015) 2–20 15
∂L;−C1 /∂s  > 0 (and/or ∂L;
−D
1 /∂s  < 0),  and L;
−C
1 > (<)L;
−D
1 for
s > (<)0, if, approximately, the absolute value of the wage
elasticity of the uncovered region’s demand is larger than 1.
∂L;−C1 /∂s  < 0 (and/or ∂L;
−D
1 /∂s  > 0),  for s > (<)0,  and L;
−C
1 < (>
) L;−D1 if, approximately, the absolute value of the wage elasticity
of the uncovered region’s demand is smaller than 1. On average:
∂E[L;−1 ]/∂s = q∂L;−C1 /∂s + (1 − q)∂L;−D1 /∂s
= q{[W1L1(W1 +
qs
1 − q )
′ + L;−D1 D]/
[W2(L;− − L;−D1 ) −
qs
1 − q + a − W
2(L;− − L;−D1 )′L;−D1 ]
−[W1L1(W1 + s)′ + L;−C1 C]/
[W2(L;− − L;−C1 ) + s + a − W2(L;− − L;−C1 )′L;−C1 ]}
(63)
Finally, for 2.c., and with perfectly negatively correlated uncer-
tainty in the sectors we derive that:
Either s is observed – which occurs with probability q – and
W1L
1(W1 − s) = (WC2 + a) [L;− − L2(WC2 + s)]
= [W2(L;− − L;−C1 ) − s + a]L;−C1
Then:
∂WA2/∂s  = [−W1L1(W1 − s)′ + (WC2 + a)L2(WC2 + s)′]/
[L;− − L2(WC2 + s) − (WC2 + a)L2(WC2 + s)′]
∂L;−C1 /∂s = [−W1L1(W1 − s) + L;−C1 ]/
[W2(L;− − L;−C1 ) − s + a − W2(L;− − L;−C1 )L;−C1 ] > 0
Or, with probability (1 − q), qs1−q is and:
W1L
1(W1 +
qs
1 − q ) = (W
D
2 + a) [L;− − L2(WD2 −
qs
1 − q )]
= [W2(L;− − L;−D1 ) +
qs
1 − q + a]L;
−D
1
∂WD2 /∂s  =
qs
1 − q [W1L
1(W1 +
qs
1 − q )
′ − (WD2 + a)L2(WD2 −
qs
1 − q )
′]/
[L;− − L2(WD2 −
qs
1 − q ) − (W
D
2 + a)L2(WD2 −
qs
1 − q )
′]
∂L;−D1 /∂s  =
qs
1 − q [W1L
1(W1 +
qs
1 − q )
′L;−D1 ]/
[W2(L;− − L;−D1 ) +
qs
1 − q + a − W
2(L;− − L;−D1 )L;−D1 ] < 0
∂WC2/∂s  > 0 (and/or ∂W
D
2 /∂s  < 0) and W
C
2 > (<)W
D
2 for s >
(<)0, if, approximately, if the absolute value of the wage
elasticity of the uncovered region’s demand is larger than 1.
∂WC2/∂s < 0 (and/or W
D
2 /∂s > 0) and W
C
2 < (>)W
D
2 for s > (<)0 if,
approximately, if the absolute value of the wage elasticity of the
uncovered region’s demand is smaller than 1. On  average:
∂E[W2]/∂s = q WC2/∂s + (1 − q)∂WD2 /∂s
= q{[W1L1(W1 +
qs
1 − q )
′ − (WD2 + a)L2(WD2 −
qs
1 − q )
′]/
[L;− − L2(WD − qs ) − (WD + a) L2(WD − qs )′] (64)2 1 − q 2 2 1 − q
−[W1L1(W1 − s)′ − (WC2 + a)L2(WC2 + s)′]/
[L;− − L2(WC2 + s) − (WC2 + a)L2(WC2 + s)′]}
1 ce and
(
t
ﬂ
i
r
i
u
s
r
t
o
(
(
L
r
d
5
i
1
W
>
w
0
i
∂
f
p
h
a
w
(6 A.P. Martins / Journal of Economics, Finan
As ∂L;−C1 /∂s  > 0(and/or ∂L;
−D
1 /∂s  < 0),  for s > (<)0,  L;
−C
1 >
<)L;−D1 . On average:
∂E[L;−1 ]/∂s = q ∂L;−C1 /∂s  + (1 − q)∂L;−D1 /∂s
= q{[L;−C1 − W1L1(W1 − s)]/
[W2(L;− − L;−C1 ) − s + a − W2(L;−
−L;−C1 )L;−C1 ] − [L;−D1 − W1L1(W1 +
qs
1 − q )
′]/
[W2(L;− − L;−D1 ) +
qs
1 − q + a − W
2(L;− − L;−D1 )′ L;−D1 ]}
(65)
Proposition 14:  In dualistic model with imperfect mobility in
he short-run, under productivity uncertainty and ex-post location
exibility:
14.1. A unilateral increase in risk in the covered region will result
n a rise (decrease) in the expected “net” wage if the uncovered
egion’s wage bill is convex (concave). Expected local labor force
ncreases (decreases) with uncertainty if the inverse demand of the
ncovered region multiplied by excess employment relative to total
upply is concave (convex) in L.
14.2. A unilateral increase in risk in the uncovered region will
esult in a rise (decrease) in the expected wage if the slope of
he uncovered region’s inverse demand multiplied by the square
f the excess employment relative to total labor supply increases
decreases) with employment. Expected local labor force increases
decreases) with uncertainty if the ratio [W1 L1(W1) − W2(L;− − L)
] / L is concave (convex) in L.
14.3. A perfectly correlated across regions increase in risk will
esult in a composite of the unilateral effects – a sum if positive, a
ifference if negative.
.2.2. Ex-ante location arrangements
The expected wage bill in region 2 is constant, once uncertainty
s additive to the wage. Hence, only the uncertainty affecting region
’s productivity has an impact on the labor force allocation:
1[q1L1(W1 − s1) + (1 − q1)L1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
= [W2(L;− − L;−1 ) + a]L;−1
Then:
∂L;−1 /∂s1 = q1[L1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
)′ − L1(W1 − s1)′]/
{W2(L;− − L;−1 ) + a − W2(L;−L;−1 )′L;−1 ]
(66)
For s1 > (<) 0, L1(W1 +
q1s1
1−q1 )’ > (<) L
1(W1 – s1)’ and ∂L;
−
1 / ∂s1
 (<) 0 if L1(W)’ increases with W:  ∂L;−1 increases with uncertainty
hen the covered region labor demand is convex in W.  For s1 > (<)
, ∂L;−1 / ∂s1 < (>) 0 if the covered region labor demand is concave
n W.
E[W2]/∂s1 = −W2(L;− − L;−1 )∂L;−1 /∂s2 (67)
The expected wage will move in the same direction as the labor
orce in the covered region.
Proposition 15:  With multiple coverage and imperfect mobility,
roductivity uncertainty with ex-ante location decisions.
15.1. A unilateral increase in risk in the uncovered region will
ave no effect on employment allocation or expected wage.15.2. An increase in risk in the covered region will result in
n increase (decrease) in the local labor force and of the expected
age in the economy if the covered region labor demand is convex
concave). Administrative Science 20 (2015) 2–20
6. Multiple or global coverage under imperfect mobility -
The Bhagwati-Hamada model
Assume 3.b, 4.b. and 5.b. of section I. The wages are ﬁxed in
both regions, at levels Wi, i =1,2. One can see this same (technically
speaking) scenario in, for example, Bhagwati and Hamada (1974).
Equilibrium is deﬁned by:
W1L
1(W1)/L;
−
1 = W2L2(W2)/L;−2 + a (68)
The average wage in the economy [W1 L1(W1) + W2 L2(W2)]/
L;− is ﬁxed.
Differentiating (68):
∂L;−1 /∂a = −(L;− − L;−1 )L;−1 /{W1L1(W1)
+ W2L2(W2) + a(L;− − 2L;−1 )} < 0 (69)
Proposition 16: 16.1. With multiple coverage and imper-
fect mobility, both regions will experience unemployment and
expected “net” wage is equalized across regions. The average wage
in the economy does not change with a local differential, once the
wage bill is ﬁxed. Also:
16.2. An increase in the local differential favouring one of the
regions will attract the labor force to it. Local expected wage will
decrease there and rise – as well as the expected worker’s welfare
- in the other sector.
6.1. Quantity uncertainty
6.1.1. Ex-post ﬂexibility
Then, local employment, being demand determined:
Li = Li(Wi) + Xi
Equilibrium is deﬁned by:
W1[L
1(W1) + X1]/L;−1 = W2[L2(W2) + X2]/L;−2 + a
If a is 0, one can show that the expected wage in the economy
will equal the wage bill divided by L;−: {W1 [L1(W1) + X1] + W2
[L2(W2) + X2]} / L;−. Additive uncertainty will have then no effect
on the equilibrium expected wage.
One can re-write condition (166) as:
W1[L
1(W1) + X1](L;− − L;−1 )
= W2[L2(W2) + X2]L;−1 + a(L;− − L;−1 )L;−1
Consider case 2.a: only region i is affected by uncertainty and Xj
= 0. For equilibrium:
Either s1 is observed – which occurs with probability q1 – and
∂L;−A1 /∂s1 = −∂L;−A2 A/∂s1 = L;−A2 W1/
{W1[L1(W1) + s1] + W2L2(W2) + a(L;− − 2L;−A1 )} > 0
Or, with probability (1 – q1), − q1s11−q1 is and:
∂L;−B/∂s1 = −∂L;−B/∂s1 = −
q1 L;−BW1/1 2 1 − q1 2
{W1[L1(W1) −
q1s1
1 − q1
] + W2L2(W2) + a(L;− − 2L;−B1 )} < 0
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As ∂L;−A1 /∂s1 > 0(and/or ∂L;
−B
1 /∂s1 < 0),  for s1 > (<)0,
;−A1 > (<)L;
−B
1 . On average:
∂E[L;−1 ]/∂s1 = −∂E[L;−2 ]/[6pt]∂s1 = q1∂E[L;−A1 ]/
∂s1 + (1 − q1)∂E[L;−B1 ]/∂s1
= q1W1{L;−A2 /[W1L1(W1) + W1s1 + W2L2(W2)
+a(L;− − 2L;−A1 )]
−L;−2B/[W1L1(W1) − W1
q1s1
1 − q1
+ W2L2(W2) + a(L;− − 2L;−B1 )]}
(70)
As L;−A1 > (<)L;
−B
1 – and L;
−A
2 < (>)L;
−B
2 − for s1 > (<) 0,
E[L;−1 ]/∂s1 < (>)0 around a = 0: expected labor force ﬂows away
rom the region where uncertainty rises.
Let there be case 2.b: Xi = Xj = X. In equilibrium:
Either s is observed – which occurs with probability q – and
∂L;−A1 /∂s  = −∂L;−A2 /∂s  = (L;−A2 W1 − L;−A1 W2)/
{W1[L1(W1) + s] + W2[L2(W2) + s] + a(L;− − 2L;−A1 )}
= L;−A2 W1{1 − [L1(W1) + s]/[L2(W2) + s]
+(aL;−A1 /W1)/[L2(W2) + s]}
/{W1[L1(W1) + s] + W2[L2(W2) + s] + a(L;− − 2L;−A1 )}
∂L;−A1 /∂s  > 0, and, for s > (<)0,  L;
−A
1 > (<)L;
−B
1 , if L
2(W2) >
1(W1) – after a generalized positive shock, the labor force ﬂies
way from the region of higher aggregate demand – proportion-
tely, the other becomes more appealing.
Or, with probability (1 – q), − qs1−q is and:
∂L;−B1 /∂s  = −∂L;−B2 /∂s  = −
q
1 − q (L;
−B
2 W1 − L;−B1 W2)/
{W1[L1(W1) −
qs
1 − q + W2[L
2(W2) −
qs
1 − q ] + a(L;
− − 2L;−B1 )}
= − q
1 − qL;
−B
2 W1{1 − [L1(W1) −
qs
1 − q/[L
2(W2) −
qs
1 − q ]
+(aL;−B1 /W1)/[L2(W2) −
qs
1 − q ]}/
{W1[L1(W1) −
qs
1 − q + W2[L
2(W2) −
qs
1 − q + a(L;
− − 2L;−B1 )}
Then:
∂E[L;−1 ]/∂s = −∂E[L;−2 ]/∂s = q∂E[L;−A1 ]/∂s  + (1 − q)∂E[L;−B1 ]/∂s
= q[(L;−A2 W1 − L;−A1 W2)/
{W1[L1(W1) + s] + W2[L2(W2) + s] + a(L;− − 2L;−A1 )}
−(L;−B2 W1-L;−B1 W2)/
{W1[L1(W1) −
qs
1 − q + W2[L
2(W2) −
qs
1 − q + a(L;
− − 2L;−B1 )}]
= qW1[L;−A2 {1 -[L1(W1) + s]/[L2(W2) + s]
+(aL;−A1 /W1)/[L2(W2) + s]}/
{W1[L1(W1) + s] + W2[L2(W2) + s] + a(L;− − 2L;−A1 )}
−L;−B2 {1 − [L1(W1) −
qs
1 − q ]/[L
2(W2) −
qs
1 − q ]
+(aL;−B1 /W1)/[L2(W2) −
qs
1 − q ]}/
1 qs 2 qs −B
(71{W1[L (W1) − 1 − q ] + W2[L (W2) − 1 − q ] + a(L;
− − 2L;1 )}]
As ∂L;−A1 /∂s  > 0(∂L;
−B
1 /∂s < 0),  for s > (<)0,  L;
−A
1 > (<
L;−B1 if L
2(W2) > L1(W1), given that then [L1(W1) +s] / [L2(W2) Administrative Science 20 (2015) 2–20 17
+s] increases with s, being larger (smaller) than [L1(W1) − qs1−q ] /
[L2(W2) − qs1−q ] for s > (<) 0, we  conclude that ∂E[L;−1 ]/∂s < (>)0
for s > (<) 0, if L2(W2) > L1(W1). Also, ∂E[L;
−
1 ]/∂s > (<)0 for s > (<)
0, if L2(W2) < L1(W1). After a rise in uncertainty, the labor force
will shift away from the region of smaller aggregate demand.
Let there be case 2.c: Xi = − Xj = − X. In equilibrium:
Either s is observed – which occurs with probability q – and
∂L;−A1 /∂s  = −∂L;−A2 /∂s = (L;−A2 W1 + L;−A1 W2)/
{W1[L1(W1) + s] + W2[L2(W2) − s] + a(L;− − 2L;−A1 )}
= {[L1(W1) + L2(W2)aL;−A1 /W1] L;−A2 W1/[L2(W2) − s]}/
{W1[L1(W1) + s] + W2[L2(W2) − s] + a(L;− − 2L;−A1 )} > 0
Or, with probability (1 – q), − qs1−q is and:
∂L;−B1 /∂s  = −∂L;−B2 /∂s  = −
q
1 − q (L;
−B
2 W1 + L;−B1 W2)/
{W1[L1(W1) −
qs
1 − q ] + W2[L
2(W2) +
qs
1 − q ] + a(L;
− − 2L;−B1 )}
= − q
1 − q {[L
1(W1) + L2(W2) − aL;−B1 /W1]L;−B2 W1/[L2(W2)
+ qs
1 − q ]}/
{W1[L1(W1) −
qs
1 − q ] + W2[L
2(W2) +
qs
1 − q ] + a(L;
− − 2L;−B1 )} < 0
Then:
∂E[L;−1 ]/∂s = −∂E[L;−2 ]/∂s = q∂E[L;−A1 ]/∂s + (1 − q)∂E[L;−B1 ]/∂s
= q[(L;−A2 W1 + L;−A1 W2)/
{W1[L1(W1) + s] + W2[L2(W2) − s] + a(L;− − 2L;−A1 )}
−(L;−B2 W1 + L;−B1 W2)/
{W1[L1(W1) −
qs
1 − q ] + W2[L
2(W2) +
qs
1 − q ] + a(L;
− − 2L;−B1 )}]
= q[L;−A2 W1{1 + [L1(W1) + s]/[L2(W2) − s]
−(aL;−A1 /W1)/[L2(W2) − s]}/
{W1[L1(W1) + s] + W2[L2(W2) − s] + a(L;− − 2L;−A1 )}
−L;−B2 W1{1 + [L1(W1) −
qs
1 − q ]/[L
2(W2) +
qs
1 − q ]
−(aL;−B1 /W1)/[L2(W2) +
qs
1 − q ]}/
{W1[L1(W1) −
qs
1 − q ] + W2[L
2(W2) +
qs
1 − q ] + a(L;
− − 2L;−B1 )}]
= q[L1(W1) + L2(W2)]W1[{L;−A2 /[L2(W2) − s]}/
{W1[L1(W1) + s] + W2[L2(W2) − s] + a(L;− − 2L;−A1 )}
−{L;−B2 /[L2(W2) +
qs
1 − q ]}/
{W1[L1(W1) −
qs
1 − q ] + W2[L
2(W2) +
qs
1 − q ]
+a(L;− − 2L;−B1 )}] + a...
(72)
If W1 > W2, one can show that – around a = 0 − L;−A2 /[L2(W2) −
s] decreases with s. Then, for s > 0, ∂E[L;−1 ]/∂s < 0; for s <
0, ∂E[L;−1 ]/∂s > 0. If W1 < W2, s > (<) 0, ∂E[L;
−
1 ]/∂s > (<)0
Proposition 17:  With multiple coverage and imperfect mobility,
under quantity uncertainty and ex-post location ﬂexibility:17.1. The expected (or average) wage in the economy does not
change with uncertainty.
17.2. A unilateral increase in risk will result in a ﬂight of labor
force out of the inﬂicted region.
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17.3. A generalized and positively correlated across regions
ncrease in risk will result in a ﬂow of labor force out of the region
ith smaller aggregate employment.
17.4. A rise in perfectly and negatively correlated labor demand
ncertainty will result in a ﬂow of labor force out of the region with
ighest wage.
.1.2. Ex-ante location arrangements
Proposition 18:  With multiple coverage and imperfect mobility,
uantity uncertainty with ex-ante location decisions render labor
orce allocation and expected wages invariant to uncertainty.
.2. Productivity uncertainty
.2.1. Ex-post ﬂexibility
Then, local employment, being demand determined:
i = Li(Wi − Yi)
Equilibrium is deﬁned by:
1L
1(W1 − Y1)/L;−1 = W2L2(W2 − Y2)/L;−2 + a (73)
One can re-write condition (73) as:
1L
1(W1 − Y1)(L;− − L;−1 ) = W2L2(W2 − Y2)L;−1 + a(L;− − L;−1 )L;−1
As, for a = 0, the expected wage in the economy equals the wage
ill divided by L;−: {W1 L1(W1 − Y1) + W2 L2(W2 – Y2)} / L;−, the
xpected wage in the economy rises with uncertainty if at least one
f the demands the argument of which is random is sufﬁciently
onvex.
Consider case 2.a: only region i is affected by uncertainty and Y2
 0. For equilibrium:
Either s1 is observed – which occurs with probability q1 – and
∂L;−C1 /∂s1 = −∂L;−C2 /∂s1 = −L;−C2 W1L1(W1 − s1)′
/[W1L
1(W1 − s1) + W2L2(W2) + a(L;− − 2L;−C1 )] > 0
Or, with probability (1 – q1), − q1s11−q1 is and:
∂L;−D1 /∂s1 = −∂L;−D2 /∂s1 =
q1
1 − q1
L;−D2 W1L
1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
)′
/[W1L
1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
) + W2L2(W2) + a(L;− − 2L;−D1 )] < 0
As ∂L;−C1 /∂s1 > 0 (and/or ∂L;
−D
1 /∂s1 < 0),  for s1 > (<
 0, L;−C1 > (<)L;
−D
1 . On average:
∂E[L;−1 ]/∂s1 = −∂E[L;−2 ]/∂s1
= q1 ∂E[L;−C1 ]/∂s1 + (1 − q1)∂E[L;−D1 ]/∂s1
= q1W1{L;−D2 L1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
)′/
[W1L
1(W1 +
q1s1
1 − q1
) + W2L2(W2) + a(L;− − 2L;−D1 )]
−L;−C2 L1(W1 − s1)/[W1L1(W1 − s1) + W2L2(W2)
+a(L;− − 2 L;−C1 )]}
(74)Expected labor force ﬂows away from the region where uncer-
ainty rises, provided local labor demand is not too convex.
Let there be case 2.b: Yi = Yj = Y. In equilibrium: Administrative Science 20 (2015) 2–20
Either s is observed – which occurs with probability q – and
∂L;−C1 /∂s  = −∂L;−C2 /∂s  = −[L;−C2 W1 L1(W1 − s)′
−L;−C1 W2L2(W2 − s)]/
[W1L
1(W1 − s) + W2L2(W2 − s) + a(L;− − 2L;−C1 )]
= −L;−C2 W1[L1(W1 − s)L2(W2 − s)L1(W1 − s)/L2(W2 − s)
+ (aL;−C1 /W1)L2(W2 − s)/L2(W2 − s)]/
[W1L
1(W1 + s) + W2L2(W2 − s) + a(L;− − 2L;−C1 )]
= −L;−C2 W1{L1(W1 − s)/L1(W1 − s)L2(W2 − s)′/L2(W2 − s)
+(aL;−C1 /W1)L2(W2 − s)/[L1(W1 − s)L2(W2 − s)]}/
[W1 + W2L2(W2 − s)/L1(W1 − s) + a(L;− − 2 L;−C1 )/L1(W1 − s)]
∂L;−1 C/∂s > 0, and, for s > (<)0,  L;
−C
1 > (<)L;
−D
1 , if L
1(W1 −
s)′/L1(W1 − s) < L2(W2 − s)′/L2(W2 − s) – after a generalized pos-
itive shock, population ﬂies away from the region of lower labor
demand semi-elasticity in absolute value. It is easy to show that
L1(W1 – s)’ / L1(W1 – s) < L2(W2 – s)’ / L2(W2 – s) if L1(W1 – s) /
L2(W2 – s) increases with s and therefore, L2(W2 – s) / L1(W1 – s) <
(>) L2(W2 +
qs
1−q ) / L
1(W1 +
qs
1−q ) for s > (<) 0.
Or, with probability (1 – q), − qs1−q is and:
∂L;−D1 /∂s  = −∂L;−D2 /∂s  =
q
1 − q
[L;−D2 W1L
1(W1 +
qs
1 − q )
′ − L;−D1 W2L2(W2 +
qs
1 − q )
′]/
[W1L
1(W1 +
qs
1 − q ) + W2L
2(W2 +
qs
1 − q ) + a (L;
− − 2 L;−D1 )]
Then:
∂E[L;−1 ]/∂s = −∂E[L;−2 ]/∂s = q ∂E[L;−C1 ]/∂s + (1 − q) E[L;−D1 ]/∂s
= q{[L;−D2 W1L1(W1 +
qs
1 − q )
′ − L;−D1 W2L2(W2 +
qs
1 − q )
′]/
[W1L
1(W1 +
qs
1 − q ) + W2L
2(W2 +
qs
1 − q ) + a (L;
− − 2 L;−D1 )]
−[L;−C2 W1L1(W1 − s)′ − L;−C1 W2L2(W2 − s)′]/
[W1L
1(W1 − s) + W2L2(W2 − s) + a(L;− − 2 L;−C1 )]}
= qW1{L;−D2 [L1(W1 +
qs
1 − q )/{L
1(W1 +
qs
1 − q ) − (a L;
−D
1 /W1)}
−L2(W2 +
qs
1 − q )
′/L2(W2 +
qs
1 − q )]/
[W1L
1(W1 +
qs
1 − q )/[L
1(W1 +
qs
1 − q ) − (a L;
−D
1 /W1)]
+W2L2(W2 +
qs
1 − q )/
[L1(W1 +
qs
1 − q ) − (a L;
−D
1 /W1)] + a(L;− − 2 L;−D1 )/
[L1(W1 +
qs
1 − q ) − (a L;
−D
1 /W1)]
−L;−C2 [L1(W1 − s)′/[L1(W1 − s) − (a L;−C1 /W1)]
−L2(W2 − s)′/L2(W2 − s)]/
{W1L1(W1 − s)/[L1(W1 − s) − (a L;−C1 /W1)] + W2L2(W2 − s)/
[L1(W1 − s) − (a L;−C1 /W1)] + a(L;− − 2 L;−C1 )/[L1(W1 − s)
−(a L;−C/W1)]}
(75)1
When ∂L;−C1 /∂s  > 0, and, for s > (<)0, L;
−C
1 > (<)L;
−D
1 , and
L1(W1 − s)′/L1(W1 − s) < L2(W2 − s)′/L2(W2 − s), ∂E[L;−1 ]/∂s <
(>)0 for s > (<) 0 and E[L ; 1] decreases with uncertainty if, but not
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L1(W1)” / L1(W1) > L2(W2)” / L2(W2). ∂L;−1/∂s < 0 for s > 0 when
L1(W1)” / L1(W1) < L2(W2)” / L2(W2). Then, the labor force will
ﬂow to the region of more relatively (to its aggregate size) convex
labor demand.
Finally, let case 2.c: both regions are affected by negatively cor-
related uncertainty. For equilibrium:
W1[q L
1(W1 − s) + (1 − q) L1(W1 +
qs
)] (L;− − L;−1 )A.P. Martins / Journal of Economics, Finan
nly if, L1(W1)’ / L1(W1) increases with the argument less rapidly
han L2(W2)’/ L2(W2) does. When L1(W1 – s)’ / L1(W1 – s) > L2(W2
 s)’ / L2(W2 – s), E[L  ; 1] increases with s > 0 if L1(W1)’ / L1(W1)
ncreases with the argument more rapidly than L2(W2)’/ L2(W2)
oes.
Let there be case 2.c: Yi = − Yj = − Y. In equilibrium:
Either s is observed – which occurs with probability q – and
∂L;−C1 /∂s  = −∂L;−C2 /∂s  = −[L;−C2 W1 L1(W1 − s)′ + L;−C1 W2L2(W2 + s
[W1L
1(W1 − s) + W2L2(W2 + s) + a(L;− − 2 L;−C1 )] > 0
Or, with probability (1 – q), − qs1−q is and:
∂L;−D1 /∂s  = −∂L;−D2 /∂s  =
q
1 − q
[L;−D2 W1L
1(W1 +
qs
1 − q )
′ + L;−D1 W2L2(W2 −
qs
1 − q )
′]/
[W1L
1(W1 +
qs
1 − q ) + W2L
2(W2 −
qs
1 − q ) + a(L;
− − 2 L;−D1 )] < 0
As ∂L;−C1 /∂s  > 0 (and ∂L;
−D
1 /∂s  < 0), for s > (<) 0, L;
−C
1 >
<) L;−D1 . Then:
∂E[L;−1 ]/∂s = −∂E[L;−2 ]/∂s = q ∂E[L;−C1 ]/∂s + (1 − q)∂E[L;−D1 ]/∂s
= q{[L;−D2 W1L1(W1 +
qs
1 − q )
′ + L;−D1 W2L2(W2 −
qs
1 − q )
′]/
[W1L
1(W1 +
qs
1 − q ) + W2L
2(W2 −
qs
1 − q ) + a(L;
− − 2L;−D1 )]
−[L;−C2 W1L1(W1 − s)′ + L;−C1 W2L2(W2 + s)′]/
[W1L
1(W1 − s) + W2L2(W2 + s) + a(L;− − 2L;−C1 )]}
= q W1{L;−D2 [L1(W1 +
qs
1 − q )
′/[L1(W1 +
qs
1 − q ) − (a L;
−D
1 /W1)]
+L2(W2 −
qs
1 − q )
′/L2(W2 −
qs
1 − q )]/
[W1L
1(W1 +
qs
1 − q )/[L
1(W1 +
qs
1 − q ) − (a L;
−D
1 /W1)]
+W2 L2(W2 −
qs
1 − q )/
[L1(W1 +
qs
1 − q ) − (a L;
−D
1 /W1)] + a(L;− − 2 L;−D1 )/
[L1(W1 +
qs
1 − q ) − (a L;
−D
1 /W1)]
−L;−C2 [L1(W1 − s)′/[L1(W1 − s) − (a L;−C1 /W1)] + L2(W2 + s)′/
L2(W2 + s)]/
[W1L
1(W1 − s)/[L1(W1 − s) − (a L;−C1 /W1)] + W2L2(W2 + s)/
[L1(W1 − s) − (a L;−C1 /W1)] + a(L;− − 2L;−C1 )/
[L1(W1 − s) − (aL;−C1 /W1)]}
(76)
As ∂L;−C1 /∂s  > 0, and, for s > (<)0,  L;
−C
1 > (<)L;
−D
1 . A
eﬁnite pattern for how E[L;−] responds to uncertainty is unclear.
Proposition 19:  With multiple coverage, under productivity
ncertainty and ex-post location ﬂexibility.
19.1. A unilateral increase in risk will result in a ﬂight of expected
abor force out of the inﬂicted region provided the local demand is
ot too convex. Expected wage in the economy will rise (decrease)
f the demand of the affected region is convex (concave).
19.2. A generalized and positively correlated across regions
ncrease in risk will result in a ﬂow of labor force out of the region
ith highest semi-elasticity of labor demand in absolute value,
f (but not only if) this increases more rapidly than the other’s.
he expected wage will increase (decrease) with risk if convexity Administrative Science 20 (2015) 2–20 19
(concavity) of the weighted (by wage) sum of the labor demands
dominates.
19.3. A rise in perfectly and negatively correlated labor demand
uncertainty will result in a ﬂow difﬁcult to determine. The expected
wage will increase (decrease) with risk if convexity (concavity) of
the weighted (by wage) sum of the labor demands dominates.
6.2.2. Ex-ante location arrangements
Consider case 2.a: only region i is affected by uncertainty and Yj
= 0. For equilibrium:
Wi[qi L
i(Wi − si) + (1 − qi)Li(Wi +
qisi
1 − qi
)] (L;− − L;−i )
= WjLj(Wj)L;−i ± a(L;− − L;−1 )L;−1
Then:
∂L;−i /∂si = qiWi[Li(Wi +
qisi
1 − qi
)′ − Li(Wi − si)′] (L;− − L;−i )/
{Wi[qiLi(Wi − si) + (1 − qi)Li(Wi +
qisi
1 − qi
)
+WjLj(Wj) ± a(L;− − 2L;−1 )]}
(77)
Employment will ﬂow to (out of) a region where uncertainty
rises if the local demand of the latter is convex (concave).
Consider case 2.b: both sectors are affected by positively corre-
lated uncertainty. For equilibrium:
W1[q L
1(W1 − s) + (1 − q) L1(W1 +
qs
1 − q )](L;
− − L;−1 )
= W2[q L2(W2 − s) + (1 − q) L2(W2 +
qs
1 − q )]L;
−
1 + a L;−1 (L;− − L;−1 )
Then:
∂L;−1 /∂s  = q{W1(L;− − L;−1 ) [L1(W1 +
qs
1 − q )
′ − L1(W1 − s)′]
−W2L;−1 [L2(W2 +
qs
1 − q )’ − L
2(W2 − s)′]}/
{W1[q L1(W1 − s) + (1 − q)L1(W1 +
qs
1 − q )]
+W2[q L2(W2 − s) + (1 − q)L2(W2 +
qs
1 − q )] + a(L;
− − 2 L;−1 )]}
(78)
∂L;−1 /∂s  > 0 for s > 0 if W1(L;
− − L;−1 ) [L1(W1 + qs1−q )′ −
L1(W1 − s)′] > [L2(W2 + qs1−q )′ − L2(W2 − s)′]W2L;−1 . Around a
= 0, that is equivalent to [L1(W1 +
qs
1−q )
′ − L1(W1 – s)’] / [q L1(W1
– s) + (1 –q) L1(W1 +
qs
1−q )] > [L
2(W2 +
qs
1−q )
′ − L2(W2 – s)’] / [q
L2(W2 – s) + (1 –q) L2(W2 +
qs
1−q )]. That occurs approximately for1 − q
= W2[q L2(W2 + s) + (1 − q) L2(W2 −
qs
1 − q )] L;
−
1
+a L;−1 (L;− − L;−1 )
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Then:
∂L;−1 /∂s = q{W1(L;− − L;−1 ) [L1(W1 +
qs
1 − q ) L
1(W1 − s)]
+W2 L;−1 [L2(W2 −
qs
1 − q )
′ − L2(W2 + s)′]}/
{W1[q L1(W1 − s) + (1 − q) L1(W1 +
qs
1 − q )
′]
+W2[q L2(W2 + s) + (1 − q)L2(W2 −
qs
1 − q )] + a(L;
− − 2 L;−1 )]}
(79)
∂L;−1 /∂s > 0 for s > 0 if W1L;
−
2 [L
1(W1 + qs1−q )′ − L1(W1 − s)′] >
2L;
−
1 [L
2(W2 + s)′ − L2(W2 − qs1−q )′]. Around a = 0, that is equiva-
ent to [L1(W1 +
qs
1−q )
′ − L1(W1 – s)’] / [q L1(W1 – s) + (1 –q) L1(W1 +
qs
1−q )] > [L
2(W2 + s)’ − L2(W2 − qs1−q )′] / [q L2(W2 + s) + (1 –q) L2(W2
qs
1−q )]. That occurs (on a ﬁrst-order approximation), for s > 0, if
1(W1)” / L1(W1) > L2(W2)” / L2(W2). Then the labor force will ﬂow
o the region of more relatively (to its aggregate size) convex labor
emand.
Proposition 20:  With multiple coverage and imperfect mobility,
roductivity uncertainty with ex-ante location decisions:
20.1. A unilateral increase in risk will result in a ﬂight of the labor
orce to (out of) the inﬂicted region provided the local demand is
onvex (concave). In that case, the expected wage in the economy
ill rise (decrease).
20.2. A generalized and perfectly correlated across regions
ncrease in risk will result in a ﬂow of labor force to the region
f more relatively (to its aggregate size) convex labor demand.
he expected wage will increase (decrease) with risk if convexity
concavity) of the weighted (by wage) sum of the labor demands
ominates.
. Summary and conclusions
Effects of increasing local risk on migration and labor market
quilibrium were inspected in stylized dualistic structures under
ifferent mobility assumptions.
Summarizing:
1. A rise in local uncertainty has rarely the same effects as a
ecrease in a exogenous additive differential accruing to the peo-
le living in the area. Such coincidence was only found in totally
nstitutionalized economies or equivalent, and in ex-post decision
ontexts. That is, an increase in local risk does not necessarily repel
he expected local labor force in the long-run – even if a negative
hock does in the short-run under ﬂexible labor force responses.
2. In general, a rise in local uncertainty enhances the region’s
otential when local demand is convex: that would be compati-
le with the common knowledge that an increase in risk around
he argument of a function increases (decreases) its expected value
hen the function is convex (concave), that here would apply to
emand for aggregate local employment.As two structures are equilibrating and under different mobility
ssumptions, that general induction was conﬁrmed in what con-
erns effects on the average wage in the economy, but excepted
n many different cases, made relative or conditional in many Administrative Science 20 (2015) 2–20
different ways, when applied to the explanation of resulting labor
ﬂows. Some interesting corollaries on the relation between ﬁrst
derivatives of elasticities, ratios and products of marginal values,
and functions’ convexity were remarked along the text.
3. With respect to the impact on labor ﬂows, under free mobility,
its direction was  determined by the relative size of the (symmetric
of the) Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion of the labor demands
- semi-elasticities of labor demand slopes - of the two regions only
under quantity uncertainty and ex-post decision adjustability. In
other contexts, the relative size of plain convexity – either of the
demands or the inverse demands – would be qualifying.
Of particular interest, the Harris – Todaro model – for which an
institutionalized sector coexists with a competitive one - exhibited
outcomes dependent on the convexity of functions of the wage bill,
or similar conditions, with respect to the (some.  . .)  argument.
Complete coverage – in the B. H. structure – allowed for the
importance of the relative size of plain total employment and of
the wage level itself to be determinant – but these conditionings
had unique representation - with quantity uncertainty and ex-post
adjustability. Under productivity uncertainty, multiple risks with
ex-post ﬂexibility forwarded the importance of semi-elasticities of
labor demand.
As a ﬁnal comment we point to the fact that the empirical liter-
ature usually does not stress in any way the convexity properties
of labor demand functions. In fact, a constant wage-elasticity – of
a negatively sloped labor demand - will imply a convex demand,
but that is not a requirement deducted by producer’s theory nor a
property of all estimable functional forms. Inquiry into the subject
would have here realistic applications.
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